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SOME FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF
LIFE INSURANCE
RICHARD C. GROLL*
EOPLE in all stations of life utilize life insurance, and as a result
thereof, life insurance is one of the most popular investment
forms. Life insurance has enjoyed traditional popularity. By 1860,
the American people owned an estimated $173 million in life insur-
ance protection. By 1900, 13% of the American population owned
more than $7.6 billion. More than $3.8 billion was paid out in 1962 to
beneficiaries of policyholders who died during that year, and 651% of
the population owned more than $675.9 billion in life insurance pro-
tection.1
Because of the magnitude of the life insurance protection held, and
the policy proceeds paid each year to beneficiaries, attention has been
continually drawn to the appropriate tax treatment to be accorded
life insurance. This article first undertakes a discussion of the current
estate tax treatment accorded life insurance proceeds plus certain rec-
ommendations for statutory reform. Second, the breadth of the estate
tax provisions dealing with life insurance proceeds are questioned by
an examination of three current problems-flight insurance, employee
death benefits and insurance-annuity plans. Finally, the income tax
aspects of certain life insurance plans are considered.
ESTATE TAX HISTORY
The estate tax treatment of life insurance proceeds has been subject
to more vacillation and variation by the Treasury Department and
Congress than any other asset area. There is still considerable contro-
versy and discussion regarding life insurance and the estate tax. A dis-
cussion of the past and present treatment accorded life insurance plus
a recommendation for future action follows.
1 KILSEY & DANIELS, LIFE INSURANCE (2d ed. 1964).
* MR. GROLL is an Assistant Professor of Law at the De Paul University College of
Law. He received an A.B. from Northwestern University, a J.D. cum laude from the
Loyola University School of Law, and be has an LL.M. from Northwestern University
School of Law.
FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE
By means of the 1918 Revenue Act, the proceeds of life insurance
contracts were first made subject to the federal estate tax. The prior
Act made no express reference to life insurance.2 The two basic sub-
divisions for the tax includibility of insurance proceeds in the estate
of a decedent, found in the present Code, were also found in the 1918
provisions.3 First, proceeds payable to the estate of the insured were
taxable to his estate. Second, proceeds payable to beneficiaries other
than the estate of the insured could be taxed to the insured's estate to
the extent that such proceeds exceeded $40,000.
This original statute provided estate tax consequences where such
insurance had been "taken out by the decedent upon his own life."'4
When the proceeds were made payable to the insured's estate, no seri-
ous problems of statutory interpretation were presented, but interpreta-
tion of the phrase encountered considerable difficulty when the pro-
ceeds were made payable to beneficiaries other than the estate. This
statutory requirement created uncertainty as to its precise meaning.
The breadth of the includibility of insurance proceeds was often chal-
lenged, and the result hinged upon the court's interpretation of this
vital phrase.
The ordinary and plain meaning of the phrase would indicate that
the sole test was whether the insured had initially made application
for the policy. The Treasury's position was that the phrase had a
much greater scope than that limited interpretation. The Regulations
promulgated in 1919, by the Treasury, first introduced the "premium
payment test." They took the position that policy proceeds payable
to beneficiaries other than the insured's estate were taxable only to the
extent that the premium payments had been made by the insured. Ten
years later, the Treasury modified its position and indicated that the
insured must have possessed incidents of ownership in the insurance
policies, in addition to his payment of premiums, in order to have the
proceeds subject to the estate tax.6 The introduction of the "incidents
2 The Revenue Act of 1916 made no direct reference to life insurance for estate tax
purposes.
3 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 4, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098, which stated as follows:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated ... (f) [t]o the extent of the amount receivable by the executor or
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent
of all excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
4 Ibid. 5 Treas. Reg. S 37 (1919). 6 Treas. Reg. § 70 (1929).
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of ownership" test was the product of a 1929 decision of the Supreme
Court.7
In 1934, the Regulations took the view that the premium payment
test and the "incidents of ownership" test were alternatives, either one
of which would cause the insurance proceeds to be taxable in the
gross estate of the insured if the proceeds were payable to a beneficiary
other than the estate of the insured.' If the insured possessed any of
the incidents of ownership in the policies or if he paid the premiums,
the insurance was considered to have been taken out by the decedent
upon his own life, and thereby subjecting the insurance to the tax.
In a final attempt to give precise meaning to this imprecise phrase,
the Treasury proposed new Regulations in 1941. These took the po-
sition that the payment of premiums was the exclusive test for the
taxability of the policy proceeds which were payable to beneficiaries
other than the insured's estateY
The statutory provision for the taxability of life insurance proceeds
remained the same from 1918 to 1942. In 1942, Congress overhauled
the Internal Revenue Code and produced more precise standards for
the taxability of insurance. 10 The $40,000 exemption for proceeds pay-
able to beneficiaries other than the insured's estate was removed. The
phrase "taken out by the decedent upon his own life" was also re-
moved, and Congress adopted the substance of the Regulations prom-
ulgated by the Treasury in 1934.11 Where the policy proceeds were
payable to the insured's estate, the result was the same as under the
1918 Act, and the proceeds were subject to the tax, regardless of who
paid the premiums.
As to policy proceeds which were payable to beneficiaries other
than the estate of the insured, they were subject to the tax if either one
of two alternative requirements were satisfied. First, regardless of
who met the premium payment obligation, if the insured at his
death possessed any incidents of ownership under the policies, the pro-
ceeds were subject to estate tax. Secondly, where the insured paid the
premiums on such policies, with or without possessing any of the
7 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
s Treas. Reg. § 80 (1934).
9 Treas. Reg. 80, as amended, T.D. 5032, 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 427.
10 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 811 (g), as amended by The Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619,
§ 404, 56 Stat. 798.
11 Supra note 8.
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incidents of ownership, the proceeds were equally subject to the tax.
One wrinkle in the statutory provision was where the insured pos-
sessed none of the incidents of ownership under the policies and main-
tained only a portion of the premiums. Upon the insured's death,
only the proportion of the proceeds which corresponded to the share
of the premiums paid by the insured was made subject to the estate
tax.
1954 CODE
In 1954, Congress viewed the past history of the estate tax treat-
ment of life insurance and proceeded to eliminate the premium pay-
ment test for estate tax includibility.12 Insurance proceeds which were
paid to the estate of the insured remained fully taxable, as they were
under all Revenue Acts since 1918, but with regard to the proceeds
of life insurance payable to beneficiaries other than the insured's es-
tate, the sole test for estate tax includibility became whether the in-
sured possessed, at his death, any of the incidents of ownership under
the policies. If the insured possessed any of these incidents, exercisable
alone or in conjunction with any other person, the proceeds are in-
cludible in the estate tax, regardless of who paid the premiums.
In addition to this major change, the 1954 Code provides that a
reversionary interest in the insurance policy is an incident of owner-
ship, provided that it had a value of more than five per cent immedi-
ately prior to the insured's death.'3 This is a departure from the defi-
nition of "incidents of ownership" under the 1942 Act.
Hence, the includibility of life insurance proceeds is determined by
whether or not the insured possessed any of the requisite "incidents of
ownership." Under the 1942 provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
premium payment was the crucial test for estate tax inclusion. The
"incidents of ownership" test was not of the greatest importance, since
in most instances, the insured could not avoid paying the premiums
on his insurance, directly or indirectly, and consequently, the proceeds
were includible under the premium payment test. While the premium
payment test was in force, once the insured had started to pay the
12 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 2042. All sections hereinafter mentioned are
sections from the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, unless otherwise specified.
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 (2), which provides that the term incidents of owner-
ship includes "a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the
policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversion-
ary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the death
of the decedent."
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premiums on a policy of insurance on his life, it was not possible for
him, by transferring the policy, to remove all the proceeds from his
gross estate. The test was a permanent roadblock to such a result.
Under the 1954 provisions of the Code, the insured can maintain
the premium payments himself and still prevent tax includibility of
the proceeds if he does not possess the incidents of ownership. The
sole test described by the 1954 Code is whether or not the insured
possessed any of the "incidents" at his death. It is, therefore, upon
the interpretation of the phrase "incidents of ownership" that hinges
the estate tax consequences of most insurance arrangements. The
Regulations provide that the term is not limited in application to
ownership of the insurance contract in the technical property law
sense. It has reference to the right of the insured to the economic
benefits of the contract. The term includes "the power to change the
beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to
revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan or to obtain
from the insured a loan against the surrender value of the policy.' 14
To what extent the insured may have indirect control over the
ownership rights in the policy while not having legal ownership, and
yet subject the proceeds to estate tax, is not specifically set out in ei-
ther the Code or the Regulations. The Regulations do, however,
clearly suggest that if the insured possesses any of the enumerated
rights under the insurance contract, then, even though legal owner-
ship is held by another, the insured will have satisfied the requirement
of possessing "incidents of ownership," and the policy proceeds will
be fully taxable. In this connection, it should be remembered that an
incident of ownership need only be "possessed" in order to include
the proceeds. The word "retained" is not used in the section. Thus,
a power to change the beneficiary given the insured by a third party
is an incident of ownership.
The power to change the beneficiary is one of the most basic inci-
dents of ownership. If the power to change a beneficiary is the sole
incident of ownership possessed by an insured and such power is lost,
the proceeds should become free of estate tax liability under section
2042 of the Code. An insured may rid himself of this incident of
ownership by making an irrevocable designation of the beneficiary. 5
Such irrevocable designation has been held sufficient to rid the in-
14 Treas. Reg. S 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958).
15 Estate of Michael Collino, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956).
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sured of the power even where the irrevocably designated beneficiary
owner gave the insured a right to designate a relative to receive one-
half of the proceeds. 6 However, even though a beneficiary may be
irrevocably designated, and thereby the insured no longer possesses
the power, the insured may retain other powers or rights under the
insurance contract sufficient to warrant inclusion of the proceeds.
In cases prior to 1942, in which the insured could change the bene-
ficiary only by securing the consent of the beneficiary, the consent
requirement was considered to have deprived the insured of any
power.'" In 1942, the Internal Revenue Code was altered, and it now
provides that the proceeds of life insurance on the life of a decedent
will be included in an estate tax computation if the decedent pos-
sessed incidents of ownership "either alone or in conjunction with
any other person."18 In interpreting this added phrase, it has been held
that a decedent possessed incidents of ownership in policies transfer-
red to a trust which could be altered, amended or revoked only upon
the consent of the decedent, his wife, and daughter." This change
has caused an expansion of the estate taxation of life insurance pro-
ceeds, and estate tax inclusion should follow where an insured can
change the beneficiary only upon securing the approval of the present
beneficiary or where an insured's approval is necessary before a change
of beneficiary can take place. °
While indirect control by an insured over life insurance may con-
stitute an incident of ownership under certain circumstances, it has
been held that a right in an insured to give investment advice to the
trustee of an insurance trust,21 or a power of veto over changes of
investments by a trustee of an insurance trust 22 do not constitute in-
cidents of ownership.
16John C. Morrow, 19 T.C. 1068 (1953), wherein an employer was the owner-bene-
ficiary of a policy on the life on an employee and apart from the insurance contract,
gave the employee the right to name a relative as the recipient of one-half the death
proceeds. The court held that such contract right was not an incident of ownership.
17Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives & Granting Annuities, Ex'rs v. Comm'r,
79 F.2d 295 (3rd Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651 (1935).
18 Supra note 13.
19 Estate of Karaghusian, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956).
20Estate of Goldstein v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 264, 122 F. Supp. 677 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
21 Estate of Mudge, 27 T.C. 188 (1956).
22 Estate of Carlton v. Comm'r., 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
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While the Regulations specifically indicate that the Treasury con-
templates the scope of section 2042 to include ownership of a policy
by a corporation of which the insured is the sole stockholder,2 3 it has
been held that ownership of a 50% share of a partnership by an in-
sured does not constitute an incident of ownership over policies owned
by the partnership entity.24
In a practical manner, the changes in the law have now encouraged
many estate planners to devise numerous methods of holding and
dealing with life insurance contracts while avoiding the estate tax.
Under the 1942 provision, estate planners sought to keep the insurance
out of the estate of an insured by arranging to have the premiums
paid and incidents of ownership held by someone other than the
insured. This was a formidable task to say the least. Since the premium
payment test is no longer relevant, estate planners now devote their
attention to excluding the insurance proceeds from the estate of the
insured by having the incidents of ownership held by someone other
than the insured. The 1954 Code provision affords the tax planner a
great amount of latitude in the manipulation of life insurance.
Since the enactment of the 1954 Code, which eliminated the pay-
ment of premium test, there have been many proposals to reintroduce
the tests.25 The most basic objection rendered against the re-enactment
of the test is that when the insured does not possess any of the inci-
dents of ownership in the insurance contract, it is maintained that
nothing is transferred from the insured to the beneficiary owner at
the death of the insured. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
death of the insured merely matures a contract right in favor of the
beneficiary.26
If this line of reasoning were accepted, the premium payment test
could be considered unconstitutional, because it would constitute an
unapportioned direct tax on property in violation of Article I of the
Constitution. This type of contention was laid to rest in United States
23 Treas. Reg. S 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958).
24 Estate of Knipp v. Comm'r., 244 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 827
(1957).
25 See generally, LOUNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Grr TAXEs 277 (2d ed.
1962); Hearings Before a Subconmittee of the House of Representatives Committee
on Ways and Means, 84th Congress, 1st Sess., at 868-69 (1955); Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, 84th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1956).
26 Brown, Facts of the Life Insurance Premium Payment Test, 34 TAXES 727, 728
(1956).
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v. The Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit.27 In this case, the in-
sured made a complete assignment and transfer of the policies on his
own life. The insured retained no incidents of ownership after the
assignment date, but he did pay all the insurance premiums prior to,
and subsequent to, the assignment. While the Court recognized that
the payment of premiums under such circumstances constituted an
inter vivos gift, Congress was held to have the right to impose an estate
tax upon such gifts if they were made with a view toward death.
Therefore, a tax may be imposed on the final step, which is the ma-
turing of the right to the proceeds at the death of the insured. The
Court found that there was a transfer at the death of the insured, since
the beneficiary's right to the proceeds ripens at the death of the insured.
Since the Constitutional objections have been laid to rest, the sub-
stantive merits of the premium payment test can be considered. Advo-
cates of the re-enactment of the test suggest that the very nature of
life insurance compels the conclusion that it is not like other investment
assets, and therefore, that it should not receive the tax treatment given
other investment assets. It is urged that life insurance is "testamentary"
in nature for several significant reasons. The purchase of life insurance
on one's own life is made for the avowed purpose of providing for a
fund of money to pass at death to the objects of one's bounty. Life
insurance was devised and perpetuated in popularity as an effective
mechanism for creating this fund of money. The basic concept of life
insurance is the accomplishment of this goal, and all other attributes
of a life insurance contract are secondary in importance.28
Under this view, the insured purchases a life insurance contract in
order to create a fund of money which will pass to a named benefi-
ciary at the death of the insured, and it can be termed testamentary
in nature. While the insured can use the device of life insurance to
satisfy divergent social and business responsibilities, the primary goal
to be accomplished by the maintenance of such a contract is the cre-
ation of the fund and its passing at death. In the mind of an advocate
27 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
28 H.R. REP. No 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A316 (1954) (minority report): "It is
sought to justify this change as merely putting life insurance on a par with other
property which may be given away free from estate tax if the gift is not made 'in
contemplation of death.' But life insurance is not like other property, it is inherently
testamentary in nature. It is designed, in effect, to serve as a will regardless of its invest-
ment features. Where the insured has paid the premiums on life insurance for the
purpose of adding to what he leaves behind at his death for his beneficiary, the insur-
ance proceeds should be included in his taxable estate."
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
of the premium payment test, these inherent characteristics of life
insurance lead to the inescapable conclusion that life insurance is testa-
mentary.
Once concluding that life insurance is inherently testamentary, it
is urged that it should receive tax treatment consistent with this basic
characteristic. 29 The premium payment test then becomes a logical
method of taxing the life insurance proceeds, and one which is par-
ticularly adapted to its nature. The basis of this conclusion is that the
insured purchases the contract in order to produce the fund which
will pass to the designated beneficiary at his death. This all-important
fund is established through the payment of premiums. The premiums
are paid to the insuring company, invested and reinvested by the com-
pany, and then paid over to the beneficiary at death. Therefore,
when the economic source of the fund which passes to the beneficiary
is the insured through his premium payments, the fund should be in-
cluded in the taxable estate. The inclusion should be dependent upon
whether the insured had been financially responsible for the transfer
of the fund at his death.
While the arguments in favor of the premium payment test deserve
consideration, there are cogent arguments against the test which should
be considered. 30 The contention that life insurance is testamentary in
nature is not seriously disputed. The significant argument presented
is that life insurance is not unique in its possession of testamentary
characteristics, and that the premium payment test unfairly singles
out life insurance for discriminatory estate tax treatment. A United
States Senate report put it in this manner:
The proceeds of life insurance on a decedent are subject to tax in his estate un-
der present law if the policy is payable to the executor, if the decedent paid
the premiums on the policy (in this case includible in proportion to the amount
paid), or if the decedent possessed any elements of ownership in the policy
at date of death. No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent
initially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to
the property and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not
justified.3'
In further support of the contention that the possession or non-
possession of the economic benefits should be the decisive test rather
29 Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance: A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain Cost of
Dying, 55 HARv. L. REV. 226, 230-35 (1941).
30 Swiharr, Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Wealth, 37 IND. L.J. 167 (1962);
Brown, supra note 26.
31S. Rr.P. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954).
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than the premium payment test, it is pointed out that life insurance
contracts have certain characteristics which are similar to other in-
vestment assets. The owner of an insurance contract has the right to
use it as collateral security for a loan, he may borrow from the in-
suring company against the cash surrender value, and he has rights
to assign the contract or change the beneficiary. Since an insurance
contract does contain these features, its taxability should be determined
on the basis of economic ownership.32
PROPOSAL
In facing the problem of the proper estate tax treatment to be ac-
corded life insurance, one is faced with the continual arguments in
favor of the present tax treatment and those who favor the re-enact-
ment of the premium payment test. The argument has been continu-
ally made that the premium payment test unfairly discriminates against
life insurance. The reform enactment of 1954 was an attempt to place
life insurance on a par with other investment assets, and Section 2042
of the 1954 Revenue Code exemplifies this attempt.3 3 In basic effect,
this section provides that when the taxpayer economically owns the
life insurance contract during his lifetime, or when the policy pro-
ceeds are payable to his estate and thereby are available to meet his
debts, then the proceeds are tax includible in his estate.
It is the situation where the taxpayer did not possess any of the
requisite "incidents of ownership" during his lifetime, and yet is sub-
ject to estate tax on the policy proceeds because of his payment of
premiums, which encounters the most objection. It strikes against the
logic of many to include the proceeds of life insurance in the taxable
estate of an insured as an asset of his estate, since the insured did not
enjoy the benefits of ownership during his life-time.
The principal assault lodged against the present estate tax treatment
is that life insurance is "inherently testamentary," and therefore should
not receive the treatment accorded to "nontestamentary" investment
assets. Aside from this discussion, the practical objection to the pres-
ent tax treatment appears to be the comparable ease with which estate
tax avoidance can be achieved without substantial sacrifice. The situ-
ation in which a close member of the insured's family owns the insur-
ance policy and the insured maintains the premium payments is not
uncommon. By the use of this simple device, compliance with the
statute is achieved, and the policy proceeds go untaxed, while the
32 Swihart, supra note 30 at 180-1. 3 Supra note 31.
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economic benefits may remain, in a practical sense, available to the
insured.
Applying the logic of the advocates of the present tax treatment, it
should follow that the proceeds of life insurance contracts should be
estate tax includible if the insured enjoys the economic benefits of the
contract during his life-time. The consequences which are incident
to such ownership rights should follow even where the insured does
not technically own the policies. Even if we assume that life insurance
is not "inherently testamentary" in nature, it does not necessarily fol-
low that the policy proceeds should escape estate tax where the in-
sured, in a practical sense, enjoys the living benefits and is financially
responsible for the existence of the policy.
It should be pointed out that underlying any proposed amendment
to section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code is the assumption that
life insurance does have a testamentary quality which sets it apart from
other investment assets. Without this basic assumption, the current
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, which provide the estate
tax treatment of life insurance, would have to be indorsed. If a tax-
payer owns a share of stock which he intends his spouse to have at his
death, he may provide for its transfer prior to death. However, the
realities of the situation may show that during the transferor's life-
time he retains practical economic control over the stock. This state
of affairs does not cause the share of stock to be included in the
transferor's estate, and indeed, it should not.
While most life insurance contracts contain numerous economic
benefits accessible to the insured, during his lifetime, it is acquired
and used to effect a transfer of property at death. But those who
oppose the payment of premiums test do not squarely meet the con-
tention that life insurance is testamentary in nature. Their underlying
objection is that an asset should not be taxed as part of the estate of
a nonowner.
If it is once conceded that a life insurance contract is a testamentary
device, then an appropriate method of estate taxation must be devel-
oped. The argument that other testamentary devices may partially or
wholly escape taxation are not relevant.34 The fact that other taxing
provisions are inappropriate should not impede the development of a
method of taxing life insurance proceeds which is consistent with its
basic characteristics. On this basis, it has been suggested that the por-
34 Schlesinger, supra note 29 at 230-35.
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tion of the insurance proceeds represented by the difference between
the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy immediately prior
to the insured's death and the full death proceeds should be the focus
of attention for revision of the estate tax in this area.
3 5
This formulated amount arises as a result of an attempt to divide
life insurance proceeds into two distinct funds of money. The first
fund can be characterized as the "life fund" and is represented by the
cash surrender value of the policy during the lifetime of the insured.
Prior to the insured's death, a life insurance policy has a value repre-
sented by the cash surrender value.3 6 It is this fund which the owner
of a life insurance policy can consume, borrow against, or transfer to
another. The "life fund" of an insurance contract is clearly an asset
of the policy owner, and should the owner die holding this fund, it
should be numbered among his estate assets.
Those who object to the premium payment test assert that if an
insured does not have the economic benefit of this fund during his
lifetime, then the policy proceeds should not suddenly be numbered
among his assets at his death. This line of reasoning, however, genu-
inely proffers an argument only for noninclusion of the cash surrender
value of a life insurance contract, since it is only this element which
is deprived of an insured.
The second fund can be characterized as the "testamentary fund"
of the full life insurance death proceeds and is represented by the ex-
cess of the death proceeds over the cash surrender value of the policy
immediately prior to the insured's death. While the cash surrender
value of a policy can be freely consumed or transferred by an order
prior to the insured's death, the "testamentary fund" is not accessible
until the insured's death. This element of the full death proceeds ripens
at the death of the insured and passes to the named beneficiary solely
by reason of the death of the insured.
Since the described fund springs into existence and passes to the
named beneficiary at the death of the insured, it should be classified
as the testamentary element of the full life insurance proceeds and
taxed to the estate of the insured who has been financially responsible
for its transfer. It is, therefore, proposed that where an insured has
35 Ibid.
36 United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941); and Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312
U.S. 254 (1941) hold that the value of an insurance policy to an insured during his
lifetime is the replacement cost. The cash surrender value has been chosen for purposes
of the proposed amendment since it is definite and more easily ascertainable.
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been the economic source of the insurance proceeds through his pay-
ment of premiums, the amount of the death proceeds represented by
the excess over the cash surrender value immediately prior to the in-
sured's death should be included in his taxable estate. This result should
follow regardless of who was the owner of the policy.
It must then be considered whether this "testamentary fund" should
be controlling for estate tax purposes where the insured possessed the
incidents of ownership in the policy but did not maintain the premium
payments. Under the present statutory provision, the entire death
benefit is included in the insured's gross estate if he possessed the
requisite incidents of ownership in the policies. This treatment is con-
sistent with the estate tax treatment accorded other investment assets,
and therefore, it should be maintained. While it may be asserted that
unless the proceeds are payable to the insured's estate, he never enjoys
the full benefit of the face amount of the policy, economically, the
insured only has the benefit of the cash surrender value of the policy
during his lifetime. Hence, unless he has been responsible for the
premium payments, only the cash surrender value of the policy should
be included in his estate.
However, assets other than insurance are includible in the deced-
ent's estate when he has had ownership during his lifetime, regardless
of who provided the economic source for such ownership. Therefore,
insurance in this respect should receive similar tax treatment. When
an insured has enjoyed the living benefits under the policy, whatever
they may have been, the value as of the date of death should be estate
tax includible.
Inclusion of the described "testamentary fund" should occur when
ownership of a life insurance contract is held by someone other than
the named insured and the insured has maintained the premium pay-
ments. Under these circumstances, the insured is using his economic
resources to provide for a fund (i.e., that portion of the death pro-
ceeds over and above the cash surrender value immediately prior to
his death) to pass to a named beneficiary at his death. The proposed
test should be added to section 2042 as an additional circumstance
under which proceeds of life insurance will be subject to estate tax
liability. When an insured possesses the incidents of ownership in
policies of insurance on his own life, then the full death proceeds
should be included in his taxable estate, as now provided by section
2042.
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If an insured does not possess any of the incidents of ownership in
policies and does not make the premium payments, the proceeds
should go untaxed. The proposed amendment seeks only to add to the
present estate tax provisions the situation where an insured makes the
premium payments for life insurance policies. Under this circum-
stance, the described testamentary element will be estate tax includible
as a testamentary disposition of the insured's property. The amend-
ment is proposed in order to avoid exclusion of the full policy pro-
ceeds, where an insured provides, through his premium payment, for
a testamentary transfer. Finally, since the constitutionality of the pre-
mium payment test has been settled, the proposed amendment should
encounter no objection in this area.
PREMIUM PAYMENT AND CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
As previously indicated, the provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code attempt to place the estate tax treatment accorded life insurance
on a par with the treatment of other investment assets. Since the en-
actment of section 2042 of the 1954 Code, it has been the goal of
estate planners to provide that the insured does not possess any inci-
dents of ownership over the life insurance policies on his own life.
If the insured avoids possessing any incidents of ownership, then the
life insurance proceeds payable by reason of his death can be passed
to a named beneficiary free of the estate tax.
While a variety of considerations must be weighed prior to making
a final decision, it may be advisable under certain circumstances to
have an insured make a complete transfer of the ownership of his life
insurance policies to the intended beneficiary. In a typical situation, a
husband will transfer a policy on his own life to his wife, the desig-
nated beneficiary. While the transfer of the policy constitutes a tax-
able gift, 7 the tax will be imposed only on the value of the policy at
the time of the transfer. 38 If the transfer takes place early in the life
of the insurance policy and before a substantial cash surrender value
has been established, the replacement value as of the date of transfer
will be decidedly smaller than the face amount of the policy. Should
the beneficiary outlive the insured, a substantial net savings may result.
If the insured husband continues to pay the premiums on the life
insurance policies he has transferred, a gift for federal gift tax purposes
37 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2501.
38 See supra note 36
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is made at the time each premium is made.39 Speculation has arisen as
to possible estate tax consequences of this continuation of premium
payments by the insured husband.40 The scope of section 2035 may
include these premium payments, under certain circumstances, and
the result of such inclusion is open to question.
Section 2035 provides that the decedent's gross estate shall include
the value of all property transferred by the decedent without valuable
consideration in contemplation of death.41 The section further states
that all such transfers made within three years of the death of the
transferor decedent shall be presumed to have been made in contem-
plation of death.42 As the Treasury Regulations indicate, a transfer of
a life insurance policy in contemplation of death falls within the
scope of section 2035, and the proceeds of the policy are includible
in the insured's gross estate.43 Therefore, in the typical situation, if a
husband transfers a policy of life insurance on his own life to his wife
and he dies within three years of such transfer, the transfer will be
assumed to have been made in contemplation of death. If such asser-
tion is sustained, the full death proceeds of the life insurance policy
will be includible in the insured's gross taxable estate. 44
If a life insurance policy is transferred by an insured husband and
he survives three years after such transfer, then the transfer is brought
within the protection of section 2035(b), which indicates that no
transfer made more than three years prior to death shall be treated as
having been made in contemplation of death.45 The question then
arises as to the consequences of the husband's continued payment of
the policy premiums. The provisions of section 2042 and section 2035
39 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(b) (8) (1958).
40 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Brown & Sherman, Payments of Pre-
miums as Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 790 (1962);
Goodson, Are Life Insurance Proceeds Gifts in Contemplation of Death? 103 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 25 (1964).
41 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(a), which states: "The value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise,
in contemplation of death."
42 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b).
43 Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1 (a) (c) (1958). See Estate of Garrett, 8 T.C. 492 (1950).
44 Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
45 Supra note 42, which indicates that "no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise or
release made before such 3-year period shall be treated as having been made in contem-
plation of death."
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indicate that if the proceeds of a life insurance policy are payable to
a designated beneficiary other than the insured's estate, and if the in-
sured possessed none of the incidents of ownership over the policy,
and the transfer of the policy was not made in contemplation of death,
the proceeds should not be includible in the insured's gross taxable
estate.
Some writers suggest, however, that this result is not certain where
the insured continues to meet the premium payment obligation after
the transfer.46 A premium payment, by an insured, made to continue
a policy which is owned by another constitutes a gift for federal gift
tax purposes. A premium payment made within three years of death
will, by the terms of section 2035, be presumed to have been made in
contemplation of death. At first blush, it may be assumed that only
the cash value of the premiums paid would be includible in the taxa-
ble estate of the insured if such premium payment is classified as a
transfer in contemplation of death. However, it has been suggested
that the taxable estate should include that portion of the death pro-
ceeds attributable to the premium payments made in contemplation
of death.47
The indicated contention stems from a case involving a transfer of
a life insurance policy in contemplation of death. In Liebman v. Has-
sett,48 an insured transferred a policy of life insurance on his own life
to his wife. The insured died within two years after the transfer, and
the wife had paid the two annual premiums subsequent to the transfer.
The wife, who was the policy beneficiary, conceded that the policy
had been transferred in contemplation of death, but she argued that
her husband's estate should only include the cash surrender value of
the policy as of the transfer date. The court held that the face amount
of the policy less that proportionate amount of the insurance proceeds
purchased with the premiums paid by the transferee was to be in-
cluded in the gross taxable estate. The court's method of excluding
that portion of the insurance proceeds attributable to the wife's sub-
sequent premium payments has given rise to speculation that similar
reasoning would follow where the policy was transferred free of the
three year limitation period, but where the insured made premium
46 See generally, Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the
Insured, N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAx 260 (1955); Schwartz, Life Insurance Planning, 35
So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1962).
47 Ibid. 4S Liebman v. Hassett, supra note 44.
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payments which could be classified as transfers in contemplation of
death. This result might be sustained by taking the position that the
gift of the life insurance policies to a transferee without funds to con-
tinue the premium payments, followed by the transferor's premium
payments, should be considered as a continuing gift which is not com-
pleted util the death of the insured. 9
Returning to the typical situation, if the insured husband transferred
a life insurance policy on his own life to his wife and the policy was
nine years old when the insured died, and if the husband maintained
the premium payments during the last three years prior to his death,
then one-third of the death proceeds would be included in his gross
taxable estate under the suggested reasoning. An extension of this con-
cept might lead to the same conclusion where no prior transfer of the
life insurance policy had occurred. Where the wife initially purchases
a life insurance policy on her husband's life and solely possesses the
incidents of ownership, section 2042 would indicate that the pro-
ceeds payable to the beneficiary wife should pass free of the estate
tax. However, it might be argued that if the husband maintained the
premium payment obligation, then that portion of the insurance pro-
ceeds attributable to his premium payments made in contemplation
of death should fall into his taxable estate, even though there was no
prior ownership of the insurance policy.
In opposition to the indicated result, it may be argued that all pre-
mium payments made by an insured within three years of his death
on policies owned by another are not necessarily made in contempla-
tion of death. It has been held that a gift of life insurance made within
three years of death is not necessarily a gift in contemplation of death
where there has been a sufficient showing of "life motives." 50 Even if
it is conceded that a policy was transferred to save estate taxes, it
should not be conclusively presumed that subsequent premium pay-
ments were similarly motivated. The motivation behind the premium
payments might be to confer a present benefit upon the policy owner
by discharging his current liability.
Even if the premium payments are made in contemplation of death,
49 Cf. Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630 (1946), wherein the release
of a power of revocation by a settlor at age 82, and within three years of death,
was held to perfect an earlier transfer, but it was held not to have been made in con-
templation of death.
50 Estate of Hull, 325 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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the theorized result should not be accepted. Where an insured pays
premiums in contemplation of death, the actual dollar value of the
premiums paid only should be estate tax includible. Section 2035 causes
estate tax inclusion where a "transfer" is made in contemplation of
death. The payment of premiums by an insured is a transfer of the
sum of money used to pay the premiums. This sum of money is all
that is transferred by the insured. The insured owns nothing else prior
to the transfer. The word transfer indicates prior ownership, and in
order to sustain the proposed result, it must be alleged that the in-
sured, immediately prior to his premium payment, owned more than
the funds used to make the premium payment, namely, an interest in
the policy itself.
This reasoning is inconsistent with the facts. Where an insured
transfers the life insurance policy to his wife, the insured must divest
himself of all interest in the policy in order to escape the inclusion of
the proceeds under the coverage of section 2042. If the insured, after
the transfer, holds no interest in the policy, then no interest should
be created merely from his continued payment of insurance premi-
ums.51 The value of that fund used only to make premium payments
should be included in the taxable estate of an insured when such pay-
ments are deemed made in contemplation of death. That fund repre-
sents the totality of the interest held by an insured decedent and
transferred to another in contemplation of death.
The theorized result is an attempt to re-enact the premium pay-
ment test as a basis for the estate tax inclusion of life insurance pro-
ceeds. This test was expressly abandoned by Congress in 1954 and
should not be reestablished by judicial interpretation of section 2042.
If the result is one which is considered desirable, then section 2042
should be amended to reintroduce the test.
WHAT Is LIFE INSURANCE?
Section 2042 includes within the taxable estate, for estate purposes,
property which is described as "insurance under policies on the life
51 Cf. Goodnow v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 526, 302 F.2d 516 (1962), wherein
the decedent paid premiums on policies on her deceased husband's life which were
payable to a trust created by him of which she was the income beneficiary for life. The
question was whether the proceeds of these policies should be included in her gross
estate on the theory that she made a transfer retaining a life interest, within the meaning
of section 2036(a). The court held that the proceeds in which she had a life interest
could not be equated with the premiums which she had paid, but rather was at-
tributable to the policies transferred in trust by her husband.
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of the decedent."52 The question then arises as to the interpretation
of this vital phrase. Three problems involving the proper scope of
section 2042 are considered.
FLIGHT INSURANCE: THE NOEL CASE
A serious question of the proper interpretation to be given to the
phrase "insurance under policies on the life of the decedent" has arisen
and been presented to the Supreme Court in the Estate of Marshall L.
Noel.53 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to review the
decision of the court of appeals which held that flight insurance could
not be classified as life insurance for the purpose of applying section
2042.
The Treasury's position with regard to this type of situation is clear
and is set forth in a 1957 Revenue Ruling.54 The facts which prompted
the Ruling were that an insurer undertook to pay all damages assessed
by law against the insured, including liability for passenger death re-
sulting from an airplane accident. The payment of a sum-certain was
available to a decedent passenger's personal representative upon a re-
lease of all damages. While these basic facts did not involve accidental
death insurance or flight insurance, the Treasury indicated in the
course of setting forth its position that if the contract between the
insurance carrier and the owner of the airplane had provided that the
insurance company would unconditionally pay an agreed amount to
the estate of a passenger who died as a result of an airplane accident,
then the proceeds of such an agreement would be characterized as life
insurance for the purpose of section 2042. 5'
While the question of flight insurance proceeds had not been re-
solved by court decision prior to the Noel Case, the question had been
considered settled in the minds of many as a result of a 1929 decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board, in the Estate of Ackerman,"'
did not deal with the question of flight insurance, but rather consid-
ered whether amounts received under accident policies and life insur-
52 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 (2), which states in part: "The value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all property . . . (2) [t]o the extent of the amount
receivable by ... beneficiaries as insurance, under policies on the life of the decedent
with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of own-
ership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person."
53 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
54 Rev. Rul. 57-54, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 298.
55 Id. at 298. 5 15 B.T.A. 635 (1929).
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ance policies, which provided for double indemnity in the case of
death from accidental means, should be included in the taxable estate
of the decedent insured under the application of section 302 (g) of the
1924 Revenue Act.57 The Board realized and considered the distinc-
tion between life insurance and accident insurance, but it concluded
that for purposes of the application of the relevant Code section, they
were identical. In explaining the differences between the two types of
agreements, the Board indicated that life insurance insures against
death in any event, while accidental death policies insure against death
under certain contingencies. The Board concluded by stating "[I]n
each case the risk assumed by the insurer is the loss of the insured's
life, and the payment of the insurance money is contingent upon the
loss of life."'58
The Board further considered the distinction drawn between life
and casualty insurance for the purpose of taxing the insurance com-
pany. The applicable section of the Internal Revenue Code provided
for a tax on insurance companies upon the issuance of insurance poli-
cies and stated specifically the rates applicable to the different types of
insurance agreements. 59 In comparing this provision of the Code and
the distinction drawn, the Board presented the following argument in
support of its findings:
Since we have in one part of the Act a distinction made between the different
types of insurance policies and in another a general term which could well in-
clude two of these types, Congress would not have used the general term had
it intended that it should be applicable to only one class. The provisions of
Section 302(g) are broad enough to include both classes of insurance.60
The Board of Tax Appeals in the Ackerman case argued that the pro-
ceeds of the accidental death benefit insurance policies were logically
includible within the broad scope of the relevant Code provision.
The facts of this case are as follows: Marshall L. Noel, immediately
prior to embarking upon an airplane trip to South America, made
57 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 302 (g), 43 Stat. 253-35, which states in part: "The
value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at
the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever
situated- . . . (g) [tlo extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life, and to the extent of all
the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life.
58 Supra note 56 at 637.
59 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 5, § 503, 40 Stat. 1104.
60 Supra note 56 at 638.
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written application for two flight insurance policies in the aggregate
amount of $125,000. The policies were delivered upon issuance to his
wife, who was the named beneficiary. The policies reserved to the
insured the sole right to assign the policy benefits. The premium for
the policies were paid by the beneficiary. The policies were similar,
in most respects, to the commonly issued flight insurance policies
which provide for the payment of the principal amount should the
insured be killed by reason of a flight accident. In addition to the pro-
tection afforded against the death of the insured, the policies included
certain dollar benefits, in the event of the insured's sustaining one of
the enumerated injuries by reason of an accident.
While en route to South America, the plane on which Noel was a
passenger crashed and all were killed. After the death of the insured,
the beneficiary affected collection of the insurance proceeds from
the insurance companies, but they were not included in the estate tax
return for the insured's estate. In resisting the inclusion of the pro-
ceeds in the taxable estate, it was contended that flight insurance is not
the equivalent of "insurance under policies on the life of the decedent"
within the meaning and scope of section 2042.
The Tax Court,6l in dealing with this novel situation, rendered the
expected decision and held that the proceeds were includible in the
estate and taxable as life insurance proceeds. As to defining life in-
surance so as to include a contract of flight insurance, the court rec-
ognized a distinction between accidental death insurance and life in-
surance, but it held that the question was settled as to their being
identical for the purposes here involved. The Tax Court based its
decision on the opinion rendered in the Ackerman case.
The case was then brought before the court of appeals.62 After
a recital of the basic facts of the case, the court considered the dis-
tinction between life insurance and accidental death insurance, the
distinction being considered extremely important. Life insurance was
defined by the court to be a contract by which the insurer, in return
for the payment of the prescribed premiums, agrees to pay a specified
sum upon the occurrence of an inevitable event. The contingency
insured against is the death of the insured, regardless of its cause, as-
suming that the cause is not one which is excepted under the terms
of the policy. On the other hand, accident insurance is a contract
61 Estate of Marshall L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (1962).
62 Estate of Marshall L. Noel, 332 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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which by its terms the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured in the
case of bodily injury, or the designated beneficiary in case of the death
of the insured, for any loss sustained by reason of an event which is
evitable (or not likely to occur). The contingency insured against
is the accident. In the view of the court of appeals, death was only
one of several liability-creating consequences.
The court hinged its decision on the basic difference in the risk to
which the insurance company is exposed, under the two types of in-
surance contracts. It was indicated that once a policy of life insurance
is taken out, the exposure of the company is fixed, and the company
faces absolute liability, since the death of the insured is inevitable. The
exposure of an insuring company under a policy of flight insurance
is not absolute. The company would be forced to pay only if an un-
likely event does occur. Evidently, the court felt that this latter ex-
posure was in the nature of "casualty insurance," rather than life
insurance, although the term was never used by the court. The court
argued that "[ain accident policy which provides for the payment
of the principal sum in the event of the insured's accidental death is
not thereby converted into a life policy; such a feature does not alter
the essential nature of the insurance."' 63
In the view of the court of appeals, the essential nature of the
insurance is not life insurance, but casualty insurance. On this basis,
the proceeds of such policies are not includible in the gross taxable
estate.
At first blush, the reasoning of the court of appeals in rendering
the Noel decision might appear merely to allow the proceeds of the
flight insurance policies to escape estate tax liability. However, poten-
tial income tax consequences are presented by an attempt to distin-
guish flight insurance from life insurance. If a distinction is drawn
between life insurance proceeds and the proceeds of accidental death
insurance, for estate tax purposes, the question arises as to whether
a distinction thus exists or should exist for purposes of income taxation.
Under the 1954 Code, the proceeds of a life insurance contract,
whether received in a single sum or otherwise, are not included in
the gross taxable income of the recipient beneficiary if they are paid
by reason of the death of the insured. To be excluded from income
under the application of section 101, two requirements must be satis-
fied: the amounts must have been received under a "life insurance
63 Id. at 953.
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contract," and such amounts must "be paid by reason of the death
of the insured. ' 4 On this basis, the decision and reasoning of the
court of appeals could be used to support the contention that the
proceeds of an accidental death insurance contract (e.g., flight insur-
ance) are not the product of a life insurance contract, and therefore,
should not fall within the scope of the income tax exemption afforded
under section 101.
Since the language of the statutory definition of gross income is
broad enough to include life insurance proceeds, it was deemed neces-
sary to provide specifically in the statute for the exclusion of them
from gross income.6 Certainly, the definition of gross income is
equally broad enough to include the proceeds of accidental death
insurance. It is wondered whether the court of appeals would hold
that the proceeds of Mr. Noel's flight insurance policies, not being the
product of a life insurance contract, are subject to income tax liability.
Carrying this contention one step further, it might be argued that
such proceeds would be excluded from income tax liability under the
terms of section 104.06 This section excludes from gross income,
among other things, amounts received under accident or health in-
surance policies for personal injury. With respect to amounts received
under accident insurance, sections 104-106 form a statutory unit and
should be considered together in weighing the taxability of sickness
or injury insurance benefits. It appears, however, that sections 104-
106 should be limited to "personal injury or sickness," rather than
death benefits, and that Congress intended section 101 to afford an
income tax exemption to death benefits which satisfies its statutory
qualification. The 1954 Senate report stated, in part, that "[d]eath
benefit[s] ... under accidental and health insurance contract[s] which
have the characteristics of life insurance proceeds payable by reason
64 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a), which states, "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided .... gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum
or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason
of the death of the insured."
65 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a), which states, "except as otherwise provided ....
gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not
limited to) the following items: . . . (10) income from life insurance and endowment
contracts."
66 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 104 (a) excludes from gross income amounts received as
compensation for personal injury or sickness under workman's compensation acts;
damages received for personal injuries or sickness, whether received by suit or under
a settlement agreement; and amounts received under accident or health insurance."
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of death" are excluded under section 101 (a) as death proceeds of
life insurance.6
If the distinction, drawn by the court of appeals, between life
insurance and accidental death insurance had been upheld and made
applicable to the income tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code,
a strong argument could have been made that accidental death pro-
ceeds would be subject to income tax liability. It appears likely that
these potential income tax complications formed part of the basis for
the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari.
In addition, it was reported that should the reasoning of the court
of appeals be sustained, the result would directly affect, for estate
tax purposes, similar airplane accident payments which, for the loss of
life, amounted to $7 million in 1963. Accidental death payments from
insurance contracts totaled approximately $73 million in 1962.68
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Noel Case69 and on
April 29, 1965, the Court handed down its decision reversing the
court of appeals and holding that the proceeds of Mr. Noel's flight
insurance policies were subject to estate tax liability under the cov-
erage of section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code. In a brief opin-
ion, written by Mr. Justice Black, the Court hinged its decision on
the rationale of the Board of Tax Appeals in the Ackerman case and
tacit Congressional approval of the Ackerman result.
In short fashion, the Supreme Court set aside the distinction drawn
by the Court of Appeals between an insurance policy which is pay-
able upon the happening of an inevitable event and one payable upon
the occurrence of an evitable event, holding that there is no meaning-
ful distinction between the two types of policies for estate tax pur-
poses. The Court, in reaffirming the rationale of Ackerman stated:
This view of the Board of Tax Appeals is wholly consistent with the language
of the statute itself which makes no distinction between "policies on the life
of the decedent" which are payable in all events and those payable only if
death comes in a certain way or within a certain time.
70
After approving the reasoning of the Board of Appeals in Acker-
man, the Supreme Court pointed to the tacit Congressional approval
of estate tax inclusion by indicating the continual re-enactment of
67S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 180; H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. A29 (1954).
08 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 8, 1964, p. 5.
69 Supra note 53. 70 Id. at 681.
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section 2042 or its equivalent in a manner which never limited the
Ackerman result.7'
The court of appeals, in the Noel Case, hinged its decision on the
distinction drawn between life insurance and accidental death insur-
ance. The proceeds of an accident policy, not being the product of a
life insurance contract in the view of the court, are not within the
taxability provisions of section 2042. This statutory section covering
insurance is limited to those amounts receivable as insurance under
policies on the life of the decedent. "The term insurance refers to
life insurance of every description" is the single statement of the
Treasury Regulations as to the inclusiveness of the term, except that
the Regulations also include fraternal benefits. 72
If the Congressional intention, previously indicated,73 was that the
proceeds of accidental death insurance were in the nature of life in-
surance proceeds, for the application of section 101, then it can be
argued that such proceeds should be characterized as life insurance
proceeds for the application of section 2042. The question in both
situations is whether the proceeds are the product of a life insurance
contract, within the meaning of the Code provisions, where the
statute affords no mentioned distinction between the two types of
insurance.
The authorities are meager as to what constitutes life insurance.
In various contexts, the courts have attempted definitions, but none
have evolved for the solution of the problem at hand. In considering
whether payments made under a contract were to be classified as
life insurance or the proceeds of an annuity, it was stated as follows:
A contract of insurance is generally regarded as one whereby, for a stipulated
consideration, a party undertakes to indemnify another against loss by a specified
contingency, or peril called a risk. In the case of life insurance the contingency
is the death of the insured.74
The fact that the contingency insured against in an accidental death
policy is more narrowly defined by the terms of the policy so as to
expose the insurer to liability only as to accidental death should not
destroy its validity as a life insurance contract. Every policy, regard-
less of the purported liability of the insurance company, contains
71 Ibid.
72 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a) (1) (1958).
73 Supra note 67.
74 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 102 F.2d 380, 382 (lst Cir. 1941).
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substantial qualifications and limitations to the insurance company's
liability.
The basic test of defining insurance is that payments to qualify as
insurance must be in settlement of a contract which has exposed the
payor-company to a risk of financial loss. This requires that the
contract provide for an amount payable at death in a sum fixed by a
ratio of premiums paid to the probabilities of the risk occurring.75 In
consideration of this definition of life insurance, it does not appear
that there is a substantial difference between a policy which covers
the life of the decedent for death by accidental means and the straight
life insurance contract. The premiums, in each instance, are deter-
mined on the basis of the ratio of the premiums paid to the proba-
bilities of the occurrence of the risk insured against. The premiums
charged by the insurance companies in the Noel Case for the acci-
dental death protection were levied in consideration of this all impor-
tant ratio.
A definite distinction between life insurance contracts and accident
and health insurance contracts has been made in those cases which
considered the taxation of insurance companies. In United States v.
New York Life Insurance Company, premiums collected by the
insurance company for accidental death benefits of a life insurance
contract were classified as payment for casualty insurance, under the
terms of section 504 of the 1917 Revenue Act. The court stated as
follows:
All life policies are paid in the event of death, but the liability of the company
to pay double indemnity under such a policy depends, not upon the mere fact
of death, but upon the existence of the additional circumstance, namely, an
accident resulting in death.77
This distinction was drawn, since the taxation of the insurance
company depended upon the classification of the type of insurance
written. The policies were classified as life insurance, marine, inland
and fire insurance, and casualty insurance. The tax rates established
and imposed were based upon the type of insurance agreements en-
tered into by the taxpaying insurance company.
It appears that the court of appeals hinged its decision on the
basis that accident insurance policies (e.g., flight insurance) have the
characteristics of casualty insurance rather than life insurance. While
75 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1941).
76 12 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1926). 77 Id. at 646
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the Court did not expressly use the term "casualty insurance," the
characteristics of accident insurance, deemed determinative by the
court, allow the conclusion that it made the distinction because it felt
that such policies were in the nature of casualty insurance. The two
types of insurance are clearly distinguishable in an insurance under-
writing sense. The underwriter fixes the premiums in an accidental
death policy, based on the probabilities of the risk being realized with-
in the term of the policy. It is not certain that the risk will be realized.
The premiums charged for a life insurance policy are calculated upon
the probabilities of when the risk (the death of the insured) will be
realized. The risk is certain to occur. The distinction drawn by the
court of appeals may be meaningful in an insurance underwriting
sense, but it should be clear that this type of distinction is not mean-
ingful within the context of section 2042.
While the Supreme Court merely held in the Noel case that the
proceeds of flight insurance policies are the product of policies on
the life of the decedent within the meaning and scope of section 2042,
the rationale of this decision has more extensive meaning. The deci-
sion should set adrift the notion that the scope of section 2042 is de-
pendent upon underwriting concepts of life insurance. Technical un-
derwriting differences should not affect the applicability of the taxing
provisions of the section.
The distinction inferentially drawn by the court of appeals be-
tween life insurance and casualty insurance should hold no meaning-
ful place in consideration of the taxability of insurance proceeds paid
by reason of the death of an insured. In the history of the Internal
Revenue Code, only in those sections governing the taxation of in-
surance companies has a distinction been drawn between ordinary life
insurance and accidental death insurance. For estate tax purposes, it
appears mandatory that since accidental death policies are merely a
variant of the life insurance concept, their proceeds should fall within
the coverage of section 2042. The wording of section 2042 and the
corresponding Regulations indicate that the section should have ap-
plication to flight insurance, accidental death insurance, double in-
demnity provisions and ordinary life insurance contracts, plus term
insurance and all variations of these policies.
EMPLOYEE DEATH BENEFITS
One of the most common forms of life insurance protection arises
by reason of the employment relationship. On this basis, a discussion
FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 75
of the taxation of employee death benefits will follow, and certain rec-
ommendations are made regarding the appropriate estate tax to be ac-
corded the proceeds of employee based life insurance.
Section 2039 was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1954 in
an attempt to supply a satisfactory method of taxing employee death
benefits.78 Section 2039 (a) provides that the decedent employee's gross
estate shall include the value of an annuity or any other payment re-
ceivable by a beneficiary under any form of contract or agreement.
For the section to have application, the death benefit must be payable
under the same contract or agreement under which an annuity or
other payment was payable to the decedent, or under which the dece-
dent possessed a right to receive such annuity or payment, either alone
or in conjunction with another for his life, or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any period which
did not in fact end before his death.79
Section 2039(b) defines the amount which is subject to estate tax
inclusion under section 2039 (a). The taxable amount is limited to that
portion of the death benefit proportionately attributable to the de-
cedent's contributions to the purchase price of the contract. How-
ever, in determining the decedent's contribution, the section provides
that any contributions by the decedent's employer or former em-
ployer shall be attributed to the decedent when made by reason of
the employment relationship. 0
While section 2039 is a comprehensive attempt to subject employee
death benefits to the estate tax, the section leaves much to be desired
and some inadequacies will be considered.8 ' While the section is not
limited in its scope to employee death benefits, the following consider-
ation will focus on this element of the taxing provisions of the section.
Section 2039 states that there is no tax liability imposed unless under
a contract or agreement, either an. annuity or other payment was
78 H.R. REp. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954).
79 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (a), which states that "[t]he gross estate shall in-
clude the value of an annuity or other payment receivable by a beneficiary by reason
of surviving the decedent under any form of contract or agreement ... if, under such
contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable to the decedent, or
the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment, either alone
or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death."
80 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c), which indicates that employer contributions
are not attributable to the employee if the plan qualifies under section 401 of the Code.
81 See Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 341 (1959); Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 1217 (1957).
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payable to the employee or the employee possessed the right to receive
such annuity or other payment for his life, or for any period not as-
certained without reference to his death, or for a period which does
not in fact end before his death. While the section leaves the phrase
"was payable" undefined, a literal reading would indicate that a con-
tractually enforceable right to such payment must have existed. The
Treasury Regulations,82 however, temper this interpretation and take
the position that the phrase includes any situation where, at death, the
employee was in fact receiving payments from a benefit plan, even if
his right to receive such payments was unenforceable. This construc-
tion of the statutory language considers the phrase "was receiving"
to be synonymous with the phrase "was payable." While such inter-
pretation appears to be in conflict with a literal reading of the statute,
it is at least indirectly supported by the Committee Reports.83
However, if the decedent was not actually receiving payments at
his death, then he must have possessed a right to receive payments in
the future in order to incur the tax imposed by the section. The sec-
tion has no application if the decedent at his death had no enforceable
right to receive inter vivos payments. The Regulations84 state that a
legally enforceable right includes a forfeitable one if, prior to death,
the employee has complied with all his contractual obligations and
there has been no forfeiture.
In this connection, it should be remembered that the required con-
tract or agreement "includes any arrangement, understanding, plan
or combination of arrangements, understandings, or plans arising by
reason of the decedent's employment. ' 85 On this basis, the Regula-
tions indicate that while purely voluntary benefit payments are not
within the coverage of section 2039 since they are not paid pursuant
to a contract or agreement, such payments may be subject to tax un-
der the section where the employer has consistently made such pay-
ments in all cases irrespective of the lack of any legal rights thereto. 6
In an attempt to enlarge the scope of section 2039, with regard to
this requirement that the decedent must have been receiving or have
possessed a right to receive inter vivos payments, it has been suggested
8 2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1) (1958).
83 H.R. REP'. No. 1337, supra note 78 at A314-5, ex. 1-3.
84 Supra note 82.
85 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2), ex. 6 (1958).
86 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2), ex. 3 (1958).
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that if the decedent was receiving a salary at the time of his death,
such salary payments might qualify as payments payable to the dece-
dent employee at his death.8 7 This suggestion arises from an ambigu-
ous example in the Committee Reports, wherein an annuity which
was payable to a designated beneficiary of a deceased employee who
died prior to retirement was said to be taxable, without any direct
reference to the existence of a right in the employee to receive inter
vivos payments in the future.8 8 However, there appears to be no
direct authority either in the Code or the Regulations for this con-
clusion, and it appears doubtful that this position would be judicially
upheld.
For application of the tax consequences under section 2039, the in-
terest payable to the surviving beneficiary must be payable under a
contract or agreement. While the Regulations89 indicate that such
contract or agreement includes any arrangement, understanding, plan
or combination thereof, it appears that the survivor's benefit is not
taxed under the section unless a contractual right to such payment
exists.
The Regulations take the position that if the benefits are payable
to decedent under one contract and to the surviving beneficiary under
another, the two agreements will be construed as a single contract in
order to impose the tax under the section. ° Further, the Committee
Reports state that the benefits of the beneficiary are receivable under
a contract even if they are fixed by an option or election exercised
or exercisable by the employee, rather than directly by contract."
It is clear that the scope of section 2039 is not limited to the taxa-
tion of annuity payments. The "annuity or other payments," as to
either the employee or the beneficiary, includes equal or unequal pay-
ments, periodic or sporadic, lump or multiple payments.92 While the
payments to the surviving beneficiary may take any form, life insur-
ance is expressly excluded from the application of the section. If an
employee death benefit is in the nature of life insurance, section 2039
has no application, and the benefit will be subject to the provisions of
87 Kramer, supra note 81 at 356.
88 H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 78 at A315, ex. 4; S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 67
at 470.
89 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1 (b) (1) (1958). 9oSupra note 85.
91 S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 67 at 470, ex. 3.
92 Supra note 89.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
section 2042.3 It appears that section 2039 and section 2042 were in-
tended to be mutually exclusive in their coverage.
In determining the application of section 2039 to any given em-
ployee death benefit, the benefit must be classified either as the prod-
uct of an insurance contract or a noninsurance contract. This determi-
nation is crucial, since taxability under section 2039 is based on en-
tirely different standards than under section 2042. Under section 2042,
the test for estate taxability of insurance proceeds of a policy on the
decedent employee's life payable to a beneficiary other than his estate
is the possession or nonpossession of the requisite incidents of owner-
ship.94 Under section 2039, however, the possession of incidents of
ownership under the employee death benefit plan is not decisive,
and if all other requirements are satisfied, then the proceeds are
subject to the tax regardless of who possessed the incidents of owner-
ship.
While an employee can rid himself of the incidents of ownership
in policies of insurance on his own life, and thereby rid himself of
liability under section 2042, such tax avoidance is not unilaterally
possible under an employee death benefit which is not characterized
as life insurance.
Since the estate tax consequences of an employee death benefit can
vary sharply depending upon its classification as life insurance or non-
insurance, the question of defining life insurance must be discussed
again. The statutory provision covering life insurance includes
amounts receivable as insurance under policies on the life of the de-
cedent. 5 The Regulations expand this definition by stating that the
term "insurance" refers to life insurance of every description."' While
Congress apparently used the term with economic rather than purely
contractual aspects in mind, death benefit plans outside the commer-
cial insurance field are always open to question.
In Helvering v. Le Gierse,7 the Supreme Court indicated that the
basic test in defining insurance is that payments must be in settlement
03 Treas. Reg. S 20.2039-1(d) (1958).
94 Supra note 52. 9., Ibid.
96 Treas. Reg. S 20.2042-1 (a) (1) (1958).
97Supra note 75 at 539: "Historically and commonly insurance involves risk shift-
ing and risk distributing. That life insurance is desirable from an economic and social
standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk of loss from premature death is un-
questionable. That these elements of risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essential to
a life insurance contract is agreed by courts and commentators."
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of a contract which has exposed the payor company to a risk of
financial loss. One test suggested by the Court was that the contract
provides for an amount payable at death in a sum fixed upon a ratio
of the premiums paid to the probabilities of the risk insured against.
In this regard, one case has established what appears to be the high-
water mark for plans which contain the essential characteristics of
life insurance so as to expose their proceeds to the estate tax under
section 2042. In Commissioner v. Treganowan,98 death benefits were
payable to certain dependents of members of the New York Stock
Exchange. The beneficiary was determined under the rules of the Ex-
change, and the benefits arose from assessments imposed upon the sur-
viving Exchange members. The Tax Court99 held that the death bene-
fit was not life insurance since no insurance risk was presented. The
court further ruled that the required insurance risk was not present
since no premium was exacted in ratio to life expectancy. In review-
ing this fact situation, the court of appeals held that the plan con-
tained the essential elements of life insurance, since the risk of death
was shifted to, or diffused among, a group of people. On this basis,
the proceeds were subject to the estate tax under the coverage of
section 2042. In the opinion of the court of appeals, a death benefit
will be classified as life insurance where the risk of death is diffused
among a number of people, and the requirement that premiums must
be exacted in ratio to life expectancy is not essential. While the result
in this case can be described as merely an extension of the craft, guild,
or trade union concept of insurance, which is based upon a common
occupation and follows assessment principles, 100 this type of decision
should not be the basis of extending the concept of insurance to in-
clude all employee death benefits.
The Treasury Regulations under section 2039 set out several prin-
ciples for determining the nature of an employee death benefit.' 01 The
principles and examples contained in the Regulations involve the rela-
tionship between the reserve values established under a plan to the
death benefit under a plan. While the principles set forth can readily
be used to determine whether an insurance risk exists under a com-
98183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 854 (1950).
99 Estate of Max Strauss, 13 T.C. 159 (1949), rev'd, supra note 98.
100 Id. at 166-68 (dissenting opinion).
101 Treas. Reg. S 20.2039-1(d) (1958).
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mercial insurance policy, neither these principles nor the case deci-
sions in the field lay down practical standards for making a predictable
decision with regard to plans outside the commercial insurance field.
The difference in tax consequences between death benefits charac-
terized as life insurance and those which are the product of self-
funded or unfunded employee plans should not depend upon a find-
ing of risk-shifting, risk-distributing, diffusion or the requisite rela-
tionship between reserve values and the ultimate death benefit. It is,
therefore, proposed that all employee death benefits should receive
identical estate tax treatment, irrespective of their classification as in-
surance or noninsurance.
As indicated, while section 2039 is an attempt to subject employee
death benefits to estate tax liability, serious questions exist as to the
breadth of its application. If a decedent was not receiving, or was not
contractually entitled to receive, an inter vivos payment at the time
of his death, section 2039 may have no application. In addition, vol-
untary payments made to a surviving beneficiary of a decedent em-
ployee do not appear to come within the scope of the section.
An example in the Treasury Regulations10 2 demonstrates a curious
tax situation under the application of section 2039. Under an employ-
ment plan, an employee is entitled to receive upon retirement (at age
sixty) a lump-sum payment equal to one-half the amount credited to
his account, and he may designate a beneficiary to receive the other
half at his death after retirement. Should the employee die before
retirement, the entire amount in his account is payable to the desig-
nated beneficiary. If the employee dies one day before his sixtieth
birthday, he has a right at his death to payment of one-half of his
benefit, and therefore, the entire lump payment to the beneficiary is
included in his gross estate under section 2039. If the employee dies
one day after his sixtieth birthday, the employee no longer has any
right to any payment since he already had received his one-half pay-
ment before death. Therefore, the lump sum payment to the benefi-
ciary is not taxable under section 2039.
The solution to the problems presented by section 2039 should not
be the expansion of the definition of life insurance to include within
the scope of section 2042 all death benefits which fail to come within
the coverage of section 2039. Section 2039 should be expanded to
provide that all payments made either to the decedent's estate or to
1o2 Trcas. Reg. S 20.2039-1 (b) (2), ex. 5 (1958).
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any beneficiary should be included in the decedent's gross estate to
the extent that they are paid by reason of the employment relationship.
The inconsistencies in estate tax treatment accorded to employee
life insurance proceeds as against those accorded employee death
benefits which arise under self-funded or unfunded plans are unwar-
ranted, and therefore, the proposed scope of section 2039 should
include the death proceeds of employee benefit insurance. Employee
life insurance plans, as well as the benefits paid under self-funded or
unfunded plans, are received by reason of the employment relation-
ship and are in the form of compensation. On this basis, they all
should receive estate tax treatment separate and distinct from other
life insurance arrangements.
INSURANCE-ANNUITY PLANS
In an attempt to define life insurance for estate tax purposes, the
Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. Le Gierse'0 has been most
often quoted. In this case, an eighty year old woman purchased a
single-premium life insurance contract on her own life, in the face
amount of $25,000. While the woman was otherwise uninsurable and
no medical examination was required, the purchase was made possible
because she simultaneously purchased an annuity contract from the
same insurance company. She paid $22,946 for the life insurance con-
tract, and $4,179 was paid for the annuity, which paid an annual
stipend of $589.80.
Upon the death of the insured, the executor contended that the
proceeds payable by reason of death to a designated beneficiary should
be classified as the product of a life insurance contract and thereby
entitled to the $40,000 exemption.' 4 Since the exemption was con-
sidered a matter of legislative grace, accorded only to the proceeds
of life insurance contracts, 10 5 the Court considered the issue very
carefully. The Court held that the proceeds of the so-called life in-
surance contract could not be classified as life insurance within the
contemplation of the statute. The Court reasoned that there was no
element of insurance risk undertaken by the insurance company.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court laid considerable em-
phasis on the mathematics of the involved fact situation. Since the
insurance company received $27,125 from the sale of the two con-
103 Supra note 75. 104 Supra note 57.
105 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a) (2) (1958).
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tracts, it received more than the proceeds needed to meet the death
benefit, and therefore, no economic risk was undertaken with respect
to the decedent's untimely death. The benefit afforded under the
annuity contract exposed the insurance company to no risk of financial
loss, since the annual payments could be paid out of the interest de-
rived from the single-premium payment without impairing the pro-
ceeds to be paid at her death. In substance, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the two contracts to be interrelated and inseparable for estate
tax purposes.
In spite of the result reached in the Le Gierse case, a situation in-
volving a combination insurance-annuity plan has developed and
evoked controversy. The basis of the controversy is the result reached
in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Smith.' The facts are
basically the same as those in Le Gierse; the decedent during her life-
time purchased a single-premium policy of life insurance along with
an annuity contract. Since the decedent was uninsurable, the insurance
company accepted the life insurance contract, because the aggregate
premiums paid for both policies exceeded the face amount of the life
insurance contract. The facts are distinguishable from Le Gierse in
that the decedent, during her lifetime, irrevocably assigned the in-
surance contract to her daughter and completely divested herself of
all incidents of ownership in the policy.
While the government sought inclusion of the proceeds of the so-
termed life insurance contract, it conceded that such proceeds were
not taxable under the life insurance section of the Internal Revenue
Code, since the basic characteristics of the contract were such that the
insurance company had not undertaken an insurance risk within the
standards set down by the Le Gierse case. The government did con-
tended however, that the proceeds of insurance contract were estate
tax includible on the ground that, in substance, the transaction was a
transfer with a reservation of a life income interest. °7 The govern-
106- 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
107 Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 26, §811(c)(1)(B) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
S 2036), which states: "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property ...to the extent of any interest therein the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth) by trust or otherwise, under which he retained
for his life or for any period ... which does not in fact end before his death ... (1)
the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2)
the right either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or income therefrom"
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ment looked at the entire transaction and argued that the decedent
had deposited a sum of money with the insurance company to be paid
over to her designated beneficiary at her death and reserved the in-
come from that amount during her lifetime.
Faced with the government's new approach to the insurance-annu-
ity plan, the court of appeals sustained the government's position and
held that the realities of the fact situation indicated that a capital fund
had been deposited with the insurance company for a guaranteed an-
nual return and payment of the capital fund at the decedent's death
to the beneficiary.'0 8 The Supreme Court reversed'0° and held that,
while the two contracts arose from a single, integrated transaction,
the two contracts were separable for estate tax purposes. The prime
basis for this assertion was that the insurance company would have
sold the annuity contract without the life insurance contract. In the
view of the Court, the income paid under the annuity contract repre-
sented income paid under that contract. It did not represent a right
to income from the single-premium payment made for the life insur-
ance contract.
While the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule the decision
in Le Gierse, the result reached in the Fidelity case is based upon a
reverse assumption of the key element of the prior decision. In Le
Gierse, the Court looked at the entire transaction and held that the
two contract rights derived from the transaction were inseparable.
The two contract rights were viewed together and considered as a
unit for the purpose of characterizing the transaction and each ele-
ment of the transaction. The Fidelity Court conceded that the two
contract rights were "the product of a single, integrated transac-
tion, '"" ° but held that the single transaction gave rise to two separate
contracts. After the purchase was completed, the decedent was free
to deal with the contracts separately.
The Supreme Court, in Fidelity, indicated that the government
would have to show that the annual annuity payments were gener-
ated as income from the investment made by the decedent, via her
payment of premiums on both contracts, in order to sustain its con-
tention for estate tax inclusion. The Court, thereby, placed this type
of transaction on a par with the treatment of private annuities. When
1OS Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3rd Cir. 1957), rev'd.,
supra note 106.
10o Supra note 106. 110 ld. at 280.
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a decedent transfers money or other property to another, upon the
return promise that a specified sum of money will be paid each year
to the decedent, during his lifetime, the true nature of the transaction
may be open to serious question.
A life annuity, which a decedent purchased for himself during his
lifetime, is not taxable as part of his estate at death. If the decedent
purchases an annuity from a member of his family, this annuity will
be treated on the same basis as a commercial annuity plan where ade-
quate consideration is paid."' Whether such a family or private an-
nuity will be treated, for estate tax purposes, on a par with a com-
mercial annuity, is dependent in many instances upon the realities of
the situation. The transaction may be nothing more than a sham
transfer of title to the property, with the reservation of the income
from the property to the transferor. Generally, the court will inquire
into all the circumstances of the transaction in order to make its de-
termination. If the so-termed annuity payment is really the payment
to the transferor of the income generated from the transferred prop-
erty, then the plan will fall within the scope of section 2036.112 If,
however, a complete transfer of the property is made and the trans-
feror does not retain any interest in the transferred property, the
transaction will be treated as a commercial annuity, so long as the
promised payments are not in fact payments of the income from the
property.
It was with these basic principles regarding private annuity plans in
mind that the Supreme Court rendered the Fidelity decision. The
Court's rationale is that unless the government could establish that the
yearly annuity payments were derived from the transferred property,
its case for estate tax inclusion as a retained life income interest fails.
If these standards are applicable to the involved transaction, then
the Court's application of the facts to the standards is quite correct. As
previously indicated, while the life insurance contract would not have
been undertaken by the insurance company without the purchase of
the annuity, the annuity was not dependent upon the life insurance
contract for its existence. Indeed, the contract rights under the two
policies were severable and not interdependent in a contract sense.
111 See Sarah Bergan, I T.C. 543 (1943), wherein it is indicated that if the annuitant
pays more than the consideration needed to purchase an annuity, the balance may be
considered a gift to the transferee.
112 Supra note 107.
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The decedent was allowed, under the terms of the life insurance con-
tract, to transfer the life insurance policy without adversely affecting
her rights under the annuity contract.
Once the decedent transferred the life insurance contract to an-
other person, the transferee would be free to sell or cash in the insur-
ance contract. If such a surrender did take place, the transferee would
receive the cash surrender value, and the insurance company could not
use that amount as the income source in order to satisfy the annual
annuity payments. This should suggest that the annual annuity pay-
ments were not necessarily made from the income derived from the
decedent's total capital investment in purchasing the two contracts.
The decision has been criticized as failing to look to the true nature
of the transaction, and as too strictly adhering to the property rights
created by the transaction.113 The basic objection underlying this criti-
cism is the estate tax treatment presently accorded private annuities.
In basic effect, the courts have held, in dealing with private annuities,
that no right to income from the transferred property is retained by
the transfer or if the payment is not derived from the transferred prop-
erty specifically. 114
It can be argued that where a pre-death transfer of property is made
by a decedent, in exchange for a return promise to make annual pay-
ments, the transaction is similar in operation to a retained life income
interest, as contemplated by section 2036. While this contention may
have merit, the logical consequence of it would be to modify section
2036 so as to include the value of property transferred where any re-
turn annual payment is made because of the transfer.115 This type of
provision would cause the downfall of all annuity plans, both com-
mercial and private, for the existence of the annuity payment is always
dependent upon the transfer of the property. While the estate tax ac-
corded private annuities may be subject to discussion, the problems
presented by the Fidelity case should be considered apart from such
discussion.
Thus far, the application of section 2036 and section 2042 have
been drawn in focus in determining the estate taxability of the death
proceeds under an insurance-annuity plan. It should now be consid-
113 See Swihart, supra note 30 at 182-89; LOUNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 25
at 290.
114 Hirsh v. United States, 68 Ct. cl. 508, 35 F.2d 982 (1929).
115 Swihart, supra note 30 at 189.
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ered whether the provisions of section 2039 of the Internal Revenuc
Code" 6 have application to the problem. Section 2039 was added to
the Code in 1954 in an attempt to provide an adequate method of tax-
ing employee death benefits. Although this was the primary purpose
of enacting the section, the language is sufficiently broad to include
survivorship annuities apart from employment relationships.
Section 2039 (a) provides that the gross estate shall include the value
of an annuity or any other payment receivable by a beneficiary by
reason of surviving the decedent, under any form of contract or agree-
ment, provided that under the same contract or agreement, an annuity
or other payment was payable to the decedent for his life. In addition
to the survivorship annuity situation, the section also has application
to refund annuities, where a refund is to be paid to one other than the
estate of the purchasing annuitant. The scope of the section, more-
over, is not limited to a situation where the-payment to the surviving
beneficiary takes the form of an annuity, but includes any "other
payment" receivable by the survivor. It does not make any difference,
for the application of the section whether the fund paid to the surviv-
ing beneficiary is paid in the form of an annuity or in a lump sum.117
A literal reading of section 2039 indicates that the decedent and
the surviving beneficiary must receive their respective payments by
reason of the existence of a contract or other agreement. This would
appear to demand that both recipients must receive their payments by
reason of the same contract or agreement, as opposed to the existence
of separate contracts granting each his individual payment. This lit-
eral language is, however, tempered by the Treasury Regulations
which indicate that the contract or agreement under which the pay-
ments are made includes any arrangement, understanding or plan.118
On this basis, both parties need not receive their respective pay-
ments under the same identical contract. The Regulations take the
position that if the benefits are payable to the decedent under one con-
tract and to the surviving beneficiary under another contract, the
two agreements will be construed as a single contract for the purpose
of imposing the estate tax under section 2039."'
116 Supra note 79.
117 H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 78 at A315; Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b(2), ex. 5
(1958).
118Tras. Reg. S20.2039-1(b) (2), cx. 4 (1958).
119 Treas. Reg. S 20.2039-1(b) (2), ex. 6 (1958).
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Applying the indicated provisions of section 2039 to the facts which
existed in both the Le Gierse case and the Fidelity case, it may well be
argued that the death proceeds paid to the surviving beneficiary should
be estate tax includible under this section. In both cases, the decedent
purchased an annuity contract under which she was to receive annual
payments for her life. By reason of the same transaction, a life insur-
ance contract was purchased whereby the beneficiary was to receive a
lump sum payment at the death of the insured annuitant. Since the
death payment to be paid to the beneficiary arose from the same trans-
action by which the annuitant gained the right to receive the pay-
ments for her life, it can be asserted that both payment rights should
be treated as having arisen from a single plan or arrangement, within
the contemplation of section 2039, and thereby subject the death ben-
efit to estate tax inclusion.
There is one serious question which clouds the indicated result. Al-
though section 2039 provides that the payments to the surviving ben-
eficiary can take any form, life insurance is explicitly excluded from
the tax imposed under the section.120 The Regulations suggest that, "if
an annuity or other payment receivable by a beneficiary under a con-
tract or agreement is in substance the proceeds of insurance under a
policy on the life of the decedent, section 2039(a) and (b) does not
apply.' 121
Hence, it must be determined whether the payments to the surviv-
ing beneficiary constitute life insurance, for if the benefits payable at
death are in the form of life insurance, they will not be subject to the
coverage of section 2039 but must be governed by the provisions of
section 2042.
The test of life insurance is the existence of an insurance risk, and
it can be determined by an examination of the reserve value under the
contract. 22 If the reserve value under the contract is less than the
death benefit, the entire proceeds of the contract are classified as in-
surance, but if the reserve value under the contract is more than or
equal to the death benefit, then the death proceeds are not properly
life insurance and can be subject to section 2039.123
In order to conclude that section 2039 has application to the insur-
ance-annuity plans, it is necessary to find that the contract rights of
the annuitant and the surviving beneficiary arose from a single inte-
120 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d) (1958).
121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid.
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grated transaction. This finding is required in order to assert that the
reserve value for the two contracts should be considered together in
determining whether an insurance risk exists. Considered separately
the reserve value on the life insurance contract is less than the death
benefit. However, if the reserve value of the annuity and life insurance
are considered together, the combined reserve value is larger than the
death benefit.
In resolving this issue, we return to the Supreme Court opinions
rendered in both the Le Gierse case and the Fidelity case. As previ-
ously indicated, the Supreme Court in Le Gierse stated that no insur-
ance risk existed under the combined insurance-annuity plan. This
decision was reached because the insuring company received more
than the death proceeds in premiums for the two contracts.
On this basis, it can be asserted that where such an insurance-
annuity arrangement arises from a single integrated transaction, as ex-
isted in both the Le Gierse and Fidelity cases, then the death benefits
should be taxable under the scope of section 2039. The two contracts
should be considered the product of one contract, as provided in the
Treasury Regulations under section 2039.124 Where, however, a de-
cedent purchases a life annuity contract and a life insurance contract
under separate and distinct transactions, section 2042 should govern
the taxability of the death benefit.
It is asserted that the insurance-annuity problem should not be al-
lowed to stand in its present form. It appears illogical that the death
proceeds of such plans should remain completely free of the estate
tax. The application of section 2039 should be given serious consid-
eration. However, it might be argued that the provisions of section
2042 should cover the death proceeds.
Considering another solution to the problem, the Court, in the Le
Gierse case, held that the entire purchase transaction should be con-
sidered as a unit for the purpose of determining its true nature relative
to the estate tax. While the the Court considered the annuity contract
and the life insurance contract as inseparable, it should be remem-
bered that the decision was rendered in the context of the estate tax
provisions then in existence. At that time, life insurance payable to
beneficiaries other than the estate of the insured was entitled to the
benefit of a $40,000 exemption. The protection of this exemption
124 Supra note 119.
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from tax avoidance devices motivated the Court in rendering its
opinion.
The Court in the Fidelity case considered the nature of the entire
purchase transaction and held that the two contracts were separable.
The annuity was not dependent upon the life insurance contract for
its existence. The annuity contract could have been purchased from
the insurance company in an isolated unrelated transaction. There-
fore, it can be asserted that the annuity contract must be considered
separate and apart from the life insurance contract. The basic motiva-
tion of the insured in entering into the integrated transaction must,
therefore, have been the purchase of the otherwise unattainable life
insurance contract. If the decedent paid the same amount for the an-
nuity contract as would have been charged had it been sold without
the insurance contract, then the two contracts should be considered
separately in determining the estate tax treatment.
The cloud which hangs over the Fidelity decision can be consid-
ered as not resulting from the treatment rendered by the Court, but the
conditions for dealing with the situation as established by the Le Gierse
decision. Since the decedent paid less than the full amount of the face
value for the life insurance contract, the insurance company subjected
itself to a risk of financial loss should the decedent die immediately.
Considering the life insurance element alone, an insurance risk was
undertaken by the insurer, and therefore, this alleged insurance con-
tract should be termed an insurance contract for estate tax purposes.
Under this line of reasoning, the life insurance element would be
subject to the same estate tax provisions as accorded other life insur-
ance contracts, and thereby subjected to the same policy considera-
tions. The restrictions imposed by the Le Gierse case should not be
made applicable to present insurance-annuity plans, since the circum-
stances present at the time of the Le Gierse case are no longer present.
However, under the present state of decisions in this area, the death
benefit paid to the surviving beneficiary under an insurance-annuity
plan is not the product of a life insurance contract. This view has now
been expressly adopted by the Treasury. In addition, the Supreme
Court has set aside the attempt to classify the plan as one resulting in a
retained life income interest, within the coverage of section 2036, and
the Treasury has now, at least partially, conceded to this position. 12 5
125 Rev. Rul. 65-69, 1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 11, takes a position consistent with
the decision reached by the Supreme Court in the Fidelity case, and holds that the life
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On this basis, the death benefit which flows to the surviving benefi-
ciary under an insurance-annuity plan should fall within the taxable
estate of the annuitant by reason of the provision of section 2039 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
INCOME TAX
Certain tax advantages granted to life insurance, plus its widespread
popularity have caused the development of diverse tax-savings and
tax-avoidance devices, which utilize the life insurance contract. Cer-
tain of the currently popular life insurance arrangements and those
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which render them advan-
tageous follow.
FINANCED INSURANCE PLANS
As a general rule all interest paid or accrued within a taxable year
on an indebtedness is deductible by the taxpayer in computing his tax-
able income." 6 This provision coupled with the nature of life insur-
ance contracts has afforded certain taxpayers the opportunity to uti-
lize an insurance plan whereby an insured can purchase an insurance
contract at little or no cost.'27 In a simplified manner, the insurance
insurance portion of an insurance-annuity plan will not be included in an insured's
taxable estate under section 2036 of the Code, as long as the proceeds are payable to a
named beneficiary and all rights in the insurance policy have been irrevocably and
completely assigned.
Rev. Rule 65-67, 1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 11 takes the position that the proceeds
of a life insurance policy under an insurance-annuity plan (which could not have
been acquired except in combination with a non-refund annuity contract purchased
for a premium equal to the face amount of the insurance contract) are not excluded
from income tax liability under section 101 (a) of the Code.
Since the Supreme Court has, in substance, indicated that the proceeds of the so-
termed insurance portion of an insurance-annuity plan are not the product of an
insurance contract for the application of the estate tax under section 2042 of the Code,
it is not completely unrealistic to take the position that such death proceeds should
not receive the income tax exemption afforded by section 101 (a), supra note 64. The
rulings do not, however, deal with the possible exposure of such proceeds to estate tax
liability under the coverage of section 2039. In addition, the decision in the Fidelity
case would indicate that section 2036 has no application to an insurance-annuity plan,
even where the insured retains the incidents of ownership over the life insurance ele-
ment. On this point, the Treasury has not expressed agreement.
126 INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 163 (a), which states that "[t]here shall be allowed as
a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year of indebtedness."
127 See Van Cleve, The Bank Loan Plan: One Point of View, 10 J. AM. Soc'Y. C.L.U.
167 (1956); Becker & Sloan, Split-Dollar and Bank-Financed Insurance Plan, 35 TAXES
842 (1957); Lynch, Insurance and Related Plans Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 18
J. AM. Soc'y. C.L.U. 348 (1964).
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contract is purchased and then used as collateral security for a bank
loan. The proceeds of the bank loan are then used to pay the insurance
premiums. The plan was effective for taxpayers in the higher income
tax brackets, since the interest on such loans was income tax deducti-
ble, and the dividends on the insurance contract were not currently tax
reportable.128 The net cost of the interest paid on the loan would be
offset in whole or in part by the insurance contract dividend. There
appear to be countless variations on this basic plan, but all rely on the
validity of two assumptions: first, that the interest paid on the bank
loan is currently tax deductible, and secondly, that the insurance con-
tract dividends are currently non-tax reportable.
As originally devised, single-premium life insurance policies or
single-premium endowment policies were usually recommended for
such plans. Prior to 1942, a taxpayer could purchase a single-premium
policy, and no tax restrictions existed for his deducting the interest
charges incurred. The 1942 Internal Revenue Code addressed itself to
this problem, and the interest deduction was expressly disallowed with
respect to single-premium contracts. 29
The life insurance underwriters responded to this restriction and
plans were devised whereby the taxpayer would pre-pay the premiums
not yet due. The single-premium contract was abandoned for the
plan, and instead, monies were deposited with the insurance company
to pay the future premiums on policies requiring annual premiums
over a specified number of years as they fell due. In 1954, Congress
undertook to further curtail the market for financed single-premium
life insurance plans and the described variation by denying the interest
deduction for single-premium contracts and for those plans whereby
the taxpayer pre-paid premiums for a substantial number of years."30
128 INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 72 (e) (1) (B); and Treas. Reg. § 1.72-11 (b) (1) (1956)
allow dividends on life insurance policies which are in the nature of a return of the
premium to be tax exempt. If the dividends are left with the insurance company to
accumulate at interest, the dividends themselves are tax-exempt. However, the interest
earned on these dividends is income in the year credited if it is subject to annual with-
drawal under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(d) (1957, as amended, 1964). If the taxpayer cannot
withdraw the interest, it will not be taxed in the year credited, but when eventually
received.
129 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, S 24(a) (6), as amended by Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619,
S 129, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
130 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 264(a) (2), which states: "[n]o deduction shall be al-
lowed for . . . (2) [any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or con-
tinued to purchase or carry a single premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity
contract." INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 264(b): "For purposes of Subsection (a) (2), a
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Eleven years ago, it may have been believed that these provisions
would effectively end financed insurance plans. The facts indicate,
however, that the life insurance underwriter responds quickly to af-
fect maximum tax benefits and maintain the desirability of his prod-
uct. Therefore, financed plans have continued to remain possible.
131
The 1964 Revenue Act contains a lengthy provision designed to end
the financed insurance plan, which developed to maintain such plans
within the indicated restrictions.132 After 1954, the taxpayer pur-
chased an insurance contract with an annual premium for a specified
number of years, and then he borrowed the increase in cash value on
the insurance contract each year in order to pay the premiums. While
this type of plan was more complicated to maintain, it perpetuated the
plan, and the taxpayer still reaped the benefits afforded by the earlier
methods.
The 1964 Act contains a provision which denies an interest deduc-
tion on "indebtedness incurred or continued to pay premiums ...
under a plan to systematically borrow amounts equal to the increase
in the cash value of the contract to pay part or all of the premiums". 133
This language is similar to that found in section 265 of the Internal
Revenue Code which disallows an interest deduction for indebtedness
incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities.3 4 It appears that
the denial of the interest deduction for financed insurance plans was
enacted as an extension of the policy to deny an interest deduction
contract shall be treated as a single premium contract ... (1) if substantially all the
premiums on the contract are paid within a period of 4 years from the date on which
the contract is purchased, or (2) if an amount is deposited after March 1, 1954, with
insurer for payment of a substantial number of future premiums on the contract."
131 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Conmnittee
on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1955-56). Mr. G. S. Brown, represent-
ing the National Association of Life Underwriters, indicates that the Association has
denounced the use of financed insurance plans for some time.
132 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a) (3), added by 78 Star. 55 (1964), which states:
"[n]o deduction shall be allowed for ... (3) ...any amount paid or accrued on
indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a life insurance, endowment,
or annuity contract (other than a single premium contract or contract treated as a
single premium contract) pursuant to a plan of purchase which contemplates the sys-
tematic direct or indirect borrowing of part or all of the increases in the cash value
of such contract (either from the insurer or otherwise)."
133 Ibid.
134 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 265: "No deduction shall be allowed ... interest on
indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations . . .the interest
on which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle."
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where such deduction can be combined with the receipt of non-taxable
income.
A part of every premium used to purchase a permanent life insur-
ance contract is used to establish and maintain the policy reserve.
These reserve funds are invested by the insurance company, and a
portion of the return from the investments is added to the cash sur-
render value of the policy.1' 5 These returns are, in general, not tax-
able to the insured, 136 and it is the existence of this non-taxable ele-
ment which apparently has caused the enactment of the prohibitive
provisions of the Code. While it may be asserted that the dividend
element of an insurance contract does not constitute an income ele-
ment, it is in the nature of a return on an investment and such return
is not subject to income taxation.
For the new section to have application, the crucial test is that the
taxpayer is following a plan of systematically borrowing part or all of
the increase in the cash value of the insurance contract in order to pay
part or all of the premiums. Thus, the provision does not apply to ir-
regular borrowing to pay premiums, although it must be indicated
that the line between systematic and irregular is unclear. Any regular
borrowing, even if not followed every year or for any particular year,
can be "systematic" for this purpose. Furthermore, the borrowing
need not be over the life of the policy, it being sufficient if the pre-
miums are financed for a substantial number of years.
In furtherance of the restrictions to this life insurance arrangement,
the prescribed borrowing need not be secured by the life insurance
contract itself, but may fall within the scope of the provision even
though the taxpayer borrows on other property or on his general
credit. This raises complex problems of enforcement, because it would
appear that taxpayers who would be likely to avail themselves of a fi-
nanced insurance plan may be in the habit of borrowing. The money
flowing through the hands of such taxpayers is likely to be a mixture
of borrowed money, earned money and accumulated money. One
may wonder how carefully an individual must show that his premium
money is not his borrowed money.
There are four exceptions to the application of this section. 137 The
135 Supra note 131 at 325 (statement of Mr. H. F. Johnson).
136 Supra note 128.
137 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 264(c), added by 78 Stat. 55 (1964), provides that the
deduction shall not be denied under the section "if no part of 4 of the annual premiums
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interest deduction may be allowed where a plan fits the standards set
down by one of the exceptions. The first exception appears to lay the
principle foundation for the future work of the life insurance under-
writer in perpetuating financed insurance plans. The exception in ef-
fect provides that if any four annual premiums out of the first seven
are paid entirely in cash, without borrowing of any kind, then the
premiums may be freely financed from then on. The proposed Regu-
lations adopt a strict view of this provision and suggest that even when
four premiums are paid in cash during the first seven years, any sub-
sequent borrowing to pay premiums in excess of that amount neces-
sary for current premiums will be construed as at least partial bor-
rowing to pay the prior premiums.13 8 The provisions of the Regula-
tions endanger any loan taken out after the initial time period beyond
that necessary to pay current premiums. While this impedes the use of
financed insurance arrangements, this does not make their use impos-
sible. The individuals in higher income tax brackets who would have
the most interest in such plans are those who can most easily over-
come the new hurdles encounterd in this section.
Apparently, even the rather comprehensive provisions of the 1964
Act will not end financed insurance arrangements completely. The
question can be asked whether further provisions should be enacted
by Congress in an attempt to end the use of the interest deduction to
procure low cost or no cost insurance.
The Treasury and Congress have directed considerable attention to
the elimination of financed insurance plans. As of today, the Internal
Revenue Code denies the interest deduction for single-premium fi-
nanced insurance plans under the coverage of section 264(a) (2),
added by the 1954 Act, and interest incurred under a plan of "sys-
tematic" borrowing is now denied under section 264(a) (3), added by
the 1964 act.
While Congress has repeatedly attempted to end the tax advan-
due during the 7-year period (beginning with the date of the first premium on the
contract to which such plan relates was paid) is paid under such plan by means of
indebtedness .... if the total of the amounts paid or accrued by such person during
such taxable year for which (without regard to this paragraph) no deduction would
be allowed .... if such amount is paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred because
of an unforeseen substantial loss of income or unforeseen substantial increase in his
financial obligations, or .. .if such indebtedness was incurred in connection with his
trade or business."
1.38Treas. Reg. S 1.264-4(d) (1) (ii) (1964).
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tages of financed insurance plans, an important factor in weighing the
advisability of more extensive restrictions in the area is the very exist-
ence of the interest deduction. It has been argued that it is the interest
deduction itself which should be eliminated. 139 Since the payment of
interest is in many instances a purely personal expense and totally
unrelated to business activity, the legitimacy of allowing a deduction
for this personal expense may be questioned. Certainly, if the basic
problem is the existence of an illogical deduction, the solution is the
elimination of the deduction. This solution is without question the
simplest. Without the interest deduction, the development of such
tax-savings plans would be nonexistent.
The interest deduction may have initially arisen in a haphazard way,
but it appears that it is now deeply entrenched in the minds of most
people as a legitimate tax deduction. If it is assumed that the problem
must be solved and the solution must be found without the total elim-
ination of the interest deduction, then the merits of the present Code
provisions should be considered.
An insurance contract owned by a taxpayer constitutes a part of his
total net worth. On this basis, when an individual seeks a loan on his
general credit, a lender will consider this asset along with all others in
granting the loan. The fact that the proceeds of such loan, based on
the taxpayer's general credit, are used in whole or in part to pay in-
surance premiums should not necessarily cause the defeat of the inter-
est deduction. The entire circumstances of the loan transaction should
be taken into account in weighing the merits of the claimed deduction.
What is objectionable is the situation where the taxpayer creates the
deduction for the sole purpose of purchasing or continuing an insur-
ance contract, not where the taxpayer uses an insurance contract as
collateral, directly or indirectly, to borrow funds in order to meet his
financial need apart from a plan.
Quite properly, section 264(a) (3) of the 1964 act focuses its atten-
tion on the "systematic" nature of such transactions as prime indicia
of the tax avoidance device. The section, coupled with the coverage of
section 264(a) (2), which applies to single-premium contracts, pro-
vide well-developed restrictions at the elimination of the problem.
More extensive restrictions in this area could endanger the entire in-
terest deduction, since most individuals in debt are also meeting the
yearly financial responsibility of maintaining life insurance. Apparent-
139 SMITH, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 98 (1961).
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ly, Congress has attempted to maintain a reasonable balance between
the extremes of allowing the plan and totally destroying the interest
deduction.
In its attempt to avoid the granting of the interest deduction where
the taxpayer engages in a financed insurance plan, it is unclear why
Congress included the first exception to the application of section
264(a) (3).140 This exception provides that if any four annual pre-
miums out of the first seven are paid entirely in cash, then the restric-
tion of the section is inapplicable to the insurance contract. This ex-
ception grants unwarranted license to taxpayers to engage in financed
plans, after the expiration of the initial time period. Since the general
terms of the provision strike only at "systematic" plans of borrowing
and the other exceptions afford adequate protection against the denial
of the interest deduction under bona fide circumstances, this first ex-
ception should be eliminated. Such elimination would further tighten
the restrictions against financed insurance plans, without endangering
the interest deduction as a whole.
SPLIT-DOLLAR PLAN
One of the original Treasury proposals for action by Congress in
the enactment of the 1964 Revenue Act involved the treatment of
the Split-Dollar Plan."4' Fundamentally, the plan is part of employ-
ment fringe benefits whereby the employee is afforded the opportu-
nity to purchase life insurance protection at low cost because of his
employer's financial assistance.
While there are many variants, the basic plan has the employee
purchasing an ordinary life insurance contract on his own life and
making the initial premium payment. After the first year, as the
policy acquires a cash surrender value, the employer pays that portion
of the annual premium which equals the increase in the policy cash
surrender value. The employee pays the balance of the annual pre-
miums due not covered by the employer. It is contemplated by
the participants of such plans that the employer is making an inter-
est free loan to employee. The loan is secured by the employer's des-
ignation as beneficiary of the policy proceeds, to the extent of the
loan amount extended. In the normal course, when the employee dies
140 Supra note 137.
141 Hearing on H.R. Rep. No. 8363 Before Senate Finance Conmittee, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 142 (1964).
FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE
the employer's investment is repaid from the proceeds of the policy,
and the balance of the proceeds is paid to those other beneficiaries
designated by the employee.
Generally, the value of life insurance protection purchased by an
employer and made payable to beneficiaries named by the employee
is taxable income to the employee. 143 However, since the situation in-
volved in the Split-Dollar Plan is described as a loan transaction be-
tween the employer and his employee, the employee is not taxed on
the amounts of his employer's contributions.
A 1955 Revenue Ruling indicates the Treasury's past position with
respect to this plan.4 The Ruling supports the contention that such
plans are, in fact, in the nature of an interest free loan, and further-
more, the forbearance of the interest by the employer does not result
in taxable income to the employee. In addition, the Ruling suggests
that the return of the policy proceeds to the employer, upon the death
of the employee, is merely a return of a loan, and therefore non-
taxable. This ruling afforded the opportunity for employers to en-
gage in this type of insurance plan, and through his contributions to
premium payments, his employees received the benefit of life insur-
ance protection at minimal cost-
The Tax Court dealt with a similar type situation in the case of
J. Simpson Dean.145 While the parties did not engage in a Split-Dollar
Plan, a corporation made substantial interest free loans to its control-
ling shareholders. The government sought to include in the stock-
holder's gross income imputed interest from the gratuitous use of the
corporate funds. The argument was similar in nature to that rendered
where an employee or stockholder is afforded the opportunity to use
corporate property rent free. 46
In finding that the taxpayer did not realize taxable income as a re-
sult of the transaction, the Tax Court argued that if the stockholder
had paid interest for the use of the borrowed corporate funds, a de-
142 See also: Becker & Sloan, supra note 127; Bloom, Life Insurance and the Revenue
Act of 1964, 18 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 233 (1964).
143 Treas. Reg. S 1.61-2 (d) (2) (1963) provides that employer contributions to group-
term life insurance are not income tax includible to the employee, while contributions
to permanent life insurance are tax includible under 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 16.
144 Rev. Rul. 713, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 23.
145 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
140 Sam Rosania v. Comm'r., CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 580 (1956).
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duction would have been received which would offset any interest
income they may have realized.
While this rationale may be open to criticism,14 7 it may presently
afford the Treasury an opportunity to end the tax advantages pres-
ently allowed under the plan. In consideration of the new provisions
of the 1964 Revenue Act relating to the allowance of the interest de-
duction for financed insurance plans,14 the Treasury may adopt the
view that no interest deduction should be allowed unless the plan pro-
vides that the employee pays the full premiums for the first four
years. 40 If we characterize this plan as merely a variant of the basic
financed insurance arrangement, and thereby falling within the con-
templation of section 264(a) (3) of the Code, then unless the em-
ployee qualified under the first exception to that section, the imputed
deduction would be denied and the imputed interest could be fully
taxable.
While the Treasury actively sought a statutory cure for the Split-
Dollar Plan, Congress suggested that the proper course of action might
be by way of administrative action. 150 Responding to this suggestion,
the Treasury revoked its long standing ruling'," and announced that
for all such insurance plans after November, 1964, an employee will
be taxed each year in amounts equal to the one-year cost of the declin-
ing life insurance protection to which the employee is entitled less any
portion of the premiums paid by him.1'5 2
This Treasury position is consistent with the treatment currently
afforded life insurance provided employees under a qualified pension
or profit-sharing plan. 153 Under such plans, if life insurance is taken
out on the life of an employee and an employee designated beneficiary
147 Bloom, supra note 142. 148 Supra note 132.
140 Supra note 137.
150 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 62 (1964).
151 Supra note 144.
152 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964 TNT. REV. BULL. No. 51.
153 Treas. Reg. S 1.402 (a) (1) (3) (1956, as amended 1960): "If a trust . . purchases
under the plan retirement income, endowment or other contracts. providing life in-
surance protection, payable upon the death of the employee participant, and either
(a) tihe proceeds of such life insurance are payable to a beneficiary of the employee
participant other than the trust ... then the portion of the premium paid for the life
insurance protection provided under such contracts from either the contributions of
the employer or earnings of the trust will constitute income to the employee for the
year or years in which the contribution or earnings are applied toward the purchase
of the life insurance."
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is entitled to receive the proceeds at death, then the employee is liable
for income tax on "the portion of the premiums paid for the life in-
surance protection ... from either the contributions of the employer
or earnings of the trust". 5 4 Only the excess of the proceeds payable
during the year over the cash surrender value at the end of such year
is deemed taxable life insurance protection. The sum and substance of
both provisions is to tax the employee on the value of the current life
insurance protection made available by reason of the current employer
payments.
While the Split-Dollar Plan may be characterized as a loan transac-
tion between the employer and the employee, the indicated method of
taxation is appropriate. The economic interest in the life insurance
contract, held by an employer under such a plan, is equal to the cash
surrender value. Under this taxing method, only the value of that por-
tion of the insurance protection in excess of the cash surrender value,
attributable to the employer's contributions, would be subject to in-
come taxation. It is the benefit of this amount of insurance which the
employee genuinely obtains from the utilization of the plan. It appears
likely that the current Treasury position will be judicially upheld.
Even if this view is not supported judicially, such plans will undoubt-
edly occupy a position of concern in the Treasury, and the employer
contributions should fall prey to income tax liability.
GROUP-TERM LIFE INSURANCE
In recent years, employment fringe benefits have become increas-
ingly more popular. Diverse arrangements involving life insurance
have been developed to provide executives and other classes of em-
ployees with maximum benefits at little or no cost. Group-term life
insurance is one of the most popular forms of employee benefit plans.
The popularity of group-term life insurance is based on two im-
portant tax considerations. First, neither the annual premiums nor the
death benefits under such policies constitute income to the employee
or his beneficiaries.' 55 Second, the employer is entitled to a deduction
for the cost of the insurance provided for his employees. 86 The ex-
emption from income dates from a 1920 Legal Opinion, which indi-
cated that the plan afforded an employee no real dollar benefit. The
Opinion indicated that the prime benefit received by the employee
154 Ibid. 155 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1963).
156 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 162(a) (1).
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was "the feeling of contentment that provision had been made for his
dependents".157
The tax treatment should be contrasted with premiums paid by an
employer for individual life insurance or group permanent life insur-
ance which carries a loan or surrender value which are required to be
included in the employee's gross income. 5" If the question of the tax
treatment of group-term life insurance should first have arisen today,
it is unlikely that the Commissioner would rule in the same manner.
However, the principle of non-taxability has become firmly en-
trenched in the Regulations.
In 1964, Congress addressed itself to this situation. While it was rec-
ognized that the entire cost of this type of life insurance protection
could properly be characterized as compensation to the employee,
Congress indicated that it was economically desirable to encourage
employers to provide a limited amount of life insurance protection for
its employees.'58
The problem sought to be solved was not the defeat of group-term
life insurance plans, but the placing of a limit on the amount held by
high ranking business executives who were granted excessive amounts
of tax free group-term life insurance. 160 To correct the situation, Con-
gress enacted a lengthy provision which provides that an employee
must include in his gross income the cost of any group-term life in-
surance coverage in excess of $50,000 provided for him under a policy
carried, directly or indirectly, by his employer. 161
157 L.O. 1014, 1920-2 CUM. BULL. 88.
158 Supra note 143.
159 S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1964).
160 Hearings on H.R. Rep. No. 8363 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 142 (1964) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury Mr.
Dillon): "Within recent years, wide spread use of this exclusion privilege has devel-
oped beyond its original purpose. The provision of 'jumbo' group term insurance
coverage for high income executives has become a rather common method of providing
substantial tax-free compensation for service. In some cases, executives have enjoyed,
without payment of any tax on the premiums, the benefits of life insurance coverage
of close to $1 million, which protects their families and may substantially augment
their estate."
161 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 79, which states: "[t]here shall be included in the gross
income of an employee for the taxable year an amount equal to the cost of group-
term life insurance on his life provided for part or all of such year under a policy(or policies) carried directly or indirectly by his employer (or employers); but only
to the extent that such cost exceeds the sum of . . . (1) the cost of $50,000 of such
insurance, and (2) the amount (if any) paid by the employee toward the purchase
of such insurance."
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The imposition of this dollar limit presented potentially compli-
cating situations, which the provisions of the new Code section at-
tempt to handle. If the insurance is carried by more than one employ-
er, the employee must combine the total coverage in determining the
amount taxable to him. The employee is entitled to offset against the
cost of coverage in excess of the $50,000 limit any contributions which
he makes toward the overall coverage provided by the employer.
Therefore, where the employee makes a contribution to each dollar
block of insurance protection afforded, this cost may be used to offset
the taxable income otherwise attributable to him for the protection in
excess of the limit.
The cost of the insurance, for purposes of the taxation of the em-
ployee, is to be determined from a uniform premium table computed
on the basis of five-year age brackets, which will be published in the
Treasury Regulations. The uniform premium table will not, however,
affect the employer's deduction. The employer's deduction is still
based on his actual cost.
There are three basic exceptions to the application of this dollar
limit.162 Group-term life insurance in any amount may be provided
tax free for an individual who has reached his normal retirement age
or has become disabled, if the practice is normally followed by his
employer. Where an employer is directly or indirectly the beneficiary
of the insurance policy, the limit does not apply, since the employer
is really providing for his own economic interests rather than those of
his employee.
In addition, the new provision covers the situation where the em-
ployer provides in his employment plan for insurance coverage in ex-
cess of the $50,000 limit and the employee wishes to avoid the income
tax consequences. The employee may avoid being taxed on the insur-
ance cost by designating a charity as the sole beneficiary. Apparently,
the employee may qualify under this exception by naming a charity as
the sole beneficiary only for the amount in excess of the $50,000 limit.
It should be noted, however, that the employee who designates a
charity as beneficiary should not receive a charitable contribution de-
duction with respect to such designation.
If uniformity of tax treatment is sought, it would appear that the
cost of group-term life insurance expended by an employer should be
102 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 79(b), added by 78 Stat. 36 (1964).
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tax includible to the benefited employee. There is an economic differ-
cnce between term life insurance and permanent life insurance, how-
ever, and as indicated by Congress, the benefits extended to an em-
ployee under such a plan could properly be characterized as taxable
income. Since the tax-exempt status is so entrenched in business plan-
ning, it appears reasonable to continue the treatment. In addition, if
group-term insurance does create a desirable economic result, as indi-
cated by Congress,1 63 then the present tax treatment affords a reason-
able method of accomplishing it. The tax-exempt status should, how-
ever, be limited to group term life insurance.
TRANSFEREE-FOR-VALUE RULE
Since the statutory definition of gross income is broad enough to
include life insurance proceeds, a special provision has been inserted
in the Internal Revenue Code which specifically provides for their ex-
clusion from gross income when paid by reason of the insured's
death. 16 4
Section 101 (a) provides that gross income does not include amounts
received under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by
reason of the death of the insured. An important exception to this tax-
empt status contained in section 101 (a) (1) applies where a policy has
been transferred for valuable consideration. Unless the transferee qual-
ifies under one of the exceptions to the rule, the recipient of the life
insurance proceeds will be subject to ordinary income taxation. The
transferee-for-value is liable for ordinary income on the proceeds paid
by reason of the death of the insured in excess of his basis. 65
The Transferee-for-Value Rule was initiated by Congress in 1954
in an attempt to avoid intra-family transfers of life insurance. With-
out this provision, an insured could transfer the policy on his own life
to a close family member for consideration, and thereby avoid the
estate tax which would be levied on the proceeds paid at his death,
since he would no longer possess the incidents of ownership under the
policy.166 At the same time, the insured would avoid the gift tax conse-
quences of a gratuitous transfer.
163 Supra note 159.
164 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a): "Except as otherwise provided ... gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items: ... (10) income from life insurance and endowment contracts; ... "
165 The transferee's basis includes his premium contributions and other amounts
subsequently expended by the transferee.
166 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 2042.
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The reasoning behind the Transferee-for-Value Rule is open to
serious question. If a transfer is made for a consideration which equals
in value the current replacement cost of the policy or a similar policy,
there is no gift. If the consideration which the insured receives is less
than this replacement cost, a gift has been made to the extent of the
difference between the actual consideration received and the replace-
ment cost."" If full consideration is received by an insured for a policy
which he has transferred, his asset holdings are not diminished by rea-
son of the transfer, and, therefore, the estate tax is protected. If less
than full consideration is received by an insured, he must pay a gift
tax on that amount which is not subject to the estate tax as part of the
insured's asset holdings. On this basis, a sale transaction of a life insur-
ance contract effectuates no genuine overall estate tax savings.
Considering the rule as it now stands, the provision specifically enu-
merates that the transfer shall be exempt from the application of the
rule if the transfer was made to the insured, to a partner of the in-
sured, to a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a cor-
poration in which the insured is a shareholder or officer.6 8 Since the
intra-family situation was evidently underlying the passage of the re-
strictive section, the exceptions were included to provide that the rule
should not apply where life insurance is used for the accomplishment
of business purposes.
There is, however, one business situation which has not been specif-
ically excepted from the application of the rule. The transfer to a fel-
low stockholder by the owner of a life insurance contract is not
covered by the enumerated exceptions. If the stockholders of a closed
corporation wish to establish a cross purchase buy-sell arrangement
upon the death of one stockholder, the life insurance policy which the
decedent held on the life of his co-stockholder cannot be sold by his
estate to a surviving stockholder without subjecting the transfer to the
tax consequences of the Transferee-for-Value Rule. There are other
situations which are adversely affected by the absence of a specific
provision covering a transfer from one stockholder to a co-stock-
holder.1 9
Since the exceptions establish a pattern of excluding business ar-
rangements involving the holding and subsequent transfer of life in-
167 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1958, as amended in 1961, 1963).
1 68 TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 101 (a) (1) (B).
169 Kronrod, Income Taxation as it Relates to Life Insurance, 18 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U.
348, 350 (1964).
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surance contracts, the provisions of the relevant Code section relating
to the Transferee-for-Value Rule should be amended to except the
transfer of a life insurance contract from one stockholder to his co-
stockholder from the application of the rule. While the proposed ad-
dition to the statutory exception would afford more uniformity to the
indicated Code section, it may be reasonably argued that the entire
rule should be abolished.
CONCLUSION
Since life insurance has received almost universal acceptance, the
appropriate tax treatment to be accorded it should occupy a position
of concern in the mind of the tax planner. While the life insurance
contract does possess characteristics common to other assets, it does
have a testamentary quality which makes it a unique investment form.
Since the life insurance contract possesses unique characteristics which
are not genuinely analogous to other investment assets, the appropri-
ate tax treatment to be accorded life insurance proceeds involves
complex considerations.
Traditionally, the estate tax has been imposed upon the passage of
wealth from its owner in one generation to the recipient member of
the succeeding generation. The key to the imposition of estate tax has
hinged upon the passage of wealth from the owner to a subsequent
taker by reason of the death of such owner.
The estate taxation of life insurance should not be limited by the
treatment accorded to other investment assets. The application of the
traditional ownership test is not appropriate for life insurance. Estate
taxation of life insurance should be consistent with its unique charac-
teristics. Since the estate tax is aimed at the passage of wealth from one
generation to a succeeding generation, that fund of wealth which does
pass under an insurance contract at the death of a member of one
generation should be subject to estate tax liability. It is on this basis
that it has been proposed that the testamentary element of an insurance
contract should be subject to estate taxation regardless of the owner-
ship of the insurance contract prior to the insured's death where the
insured has been responsible through his payment of premiums for the
passage of the wealth at his death. The testamentary element is that
portion of the insurance proceeds which arises at the death of the in-
sured and passes to the beneficiary by reason of the death (i.e., that
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portion of the death proceeds over and above the cash surrender value
immediately prior to the insured's death).
While the Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on the pro-
ceeds of a life insurance contract, serious question has arisen as to the
definition of a life insurance contract. While attempts have been
made to limit the definition, for tax purposes, to technical insurance
concepts, such attempts should not succeed. A contract should be con-
sidered as having undertaken an insurance risk, and thereby subject to
the estate tax, where one undertakes to indemnify another for loss of
life upon receipt of a consideration calculated on the basis of the
probabilities of the risk (i.e., the death of the insured) being realized.
Where life insurance is utilized as part of a total benefit plan, all the
circumstances of such plan should be taken into consideration in ap-
plying the appropriate estate tax. It appears that the present provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code are not adequate to deal with the com-
plex benefit plans which have become increasingly more popular, and
on this basis a uniform method of taxing employee death benefits
should be enacted.
In addition to the recommendations for the appropriate estate tax
treatment to be accorded life insurance, certain recommendations have
been made with regard to the tax treatment of life insurance plans.
Since life insurance has enjoyed traditional popularity and such popu-
larity appears to be growing, it can be assumed that life insurance
plans will become increasingly more complex and thereby offer con-
tinual problems in both the income and estate tax areas.
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